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"SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?": THE
CURRENT STATE OF PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING ADJUDICATION AND A
PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
JoAnn D. Kamuf*
INTRODUCTION
The results from the 2004 election prove that "[1legislative redistricting
can be an exceedingly dirty business."' Partisan gerrymandering efforts
greatly influenced the election outcomes, 2 generated unprecedented media
coverage, and caused intense partisan hostility at the state and federal
level.3 Texas gained the spotlight in what commentators consider the most
egregious example of current legislative gerrymandering practices.
4
In May of 2003, more than fifty Democratic members of the State
Legislature fled Texas in the middle of the night.5  The Democrats
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
family and friends for their support, patience, and encouragement during the entire Note-
writing process. I would also like to thank Father Whelan for his guidance and assistance.
1. Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People's Business: An Examination of the
Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 Kan. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 115, 115 (2004).
2. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Schwarzenegger Proposes Overhaul of Redistricting,
Judges Not Legislators, Would Set Maps, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2005, at A16 (demonstrating
that in 2004, only thirteen congressional seats changed hands, while in 2000, forty-five seats
were considered competitive and in 1990, 151 were considered competitive).
3. See Richard L. Hasen, Looking For Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 Election L.J. 626, 626 (2004) (describing high
expectations for the Vieth decision in light of the districting trends, in which legislators are
"increasingly more adept... at, and more brazen in, redistricting to promote partisan
goals").
4. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("There is little
question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting [the
districting plan] was to gain partisan advantage."). See infra note 351 for additional
examples of extreme partisan gerrymandering.
5. Pete Slover & Matt Stiles, Democrats Disappear; Majority of AWOL Lawmakers
Where You'd Least Expect: Oklahoma, Dallas Morning News, May 13, 2003, at 1A.
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absconded in order to prevent the quorum needed for the session vote in
which Republicans planned to approve a new districting plan.6
Texas Republicans were determined to drag their fellow House
Democrats back to Texas and conduct the session vote. To expedite the
Democrats' return, the Speaker of the Texas House ordered Texas state
officials to arrest the Democrats7 and placed the Democrats' pictures on
milk cartons and playing cards to expedite their return. 8  Despite
Republican efforts, the Democrats succeeded in killing the vote in the
regular session by hiding out in a Holiday Inn in Ardmore, Oklahoma, just
across the Texas border.9
In July, Governor Rick Perry called a special legislative session to pass
the districting plan.' 0 Eleven of the twelve Texas Democratic State
Senators fled Texas by air, this time heading to Albuquerque, New Mexico,
to avoid a quorum a second time.11  Eventually, upon return of the
Democrats, the Governor called a third special session and the state
legislators passed the districting plan. 12
The Texas Legislature's plan ignored the historically rooted practice of
redistricting only after every decennial census, 13  redrawing the
congressional districts created only one year before by a Texas district
court.' 4 Under the court-mandated plan, Texas Republicans won control of
6. A quorum in the House and Senate requires two-thirds of each house to be present.
Tex. Const. art. III, § 10.
7. Patrick Kelly, Texas State Democrats Take Show to Oklahoma, The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), May 14, 2003, at Al1.
8. David Barboza & Carl Hulse, Texas' Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain
A.WO.L, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2003, at A17.
9. See id. at A17; see also R. G. Ratcliffe, Both Sides Believe Time is Their Ally,
Houston Chron., Aug. 17, 2003, at 1.
10. Natalie Gott, Democratic Lawmakers Flee Texas in Effort to Thwart Congressional
Redistricting, Associated Press, July 29, 2003, available at http://www.ap.org.
11. Clay Robison, Texas Democrats Bolt Again, Houston Chron., July 28, 2003,
http://www.chron.comlcs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/topstory2/2015694.
12. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004); see also Adam Cox,
Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 751, 789 (2004) (reporting
allegations of Karl Rove's involvement in districting plans in Texas, Ohio, and Colorado);
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let's Mess with Texas, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1587,
1587 (2004) (adding that Tom DeLay and Karl Rove played a hand in the Texas redistricting
plan). Tom DeLay is currently under investigation by the House Ethics Committee and three
of his aides were indicted for their involvement. Editorial, Democratic Cancer.
Gerrymander Abuse Knows No Limits, The San Diego Union-Trib., Sept. 27, 2004, at B6.
13. Though decennial districting is not constitutionally mandated, the U.S. Supreme
Court has functioned under the presumption that failure to do so is presumptively invalid.
See Cox, supra note 12, at 758 n.36 (discussing the evolution of the Court instituted
decennial districting in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-84 (1964)); see also Sasha
Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, The Nation, Dec. 29, 2003, at 15, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20031229&s=abramsky.
14. District courts have the authority to redraw district plans when the state legislature
fails to do so within a reasonable time after the census. See Cox, supra note 12, at 758; see
also, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33-37 (1993) (discussing circumstances in which
federal courts can undertake reapportionment, and emphasizing that federal courts must
refrain from intervening until it is clear that the state will otherwise not have a valid plan in
time for the next election).
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the State House, State Senate, and the executive branch, 15 a concentration
of Republican power unseen in 133 years.
16
Though Republicans had complete control of the state government, the
legislature sought, in 2003, to create a new districting scheme to protect the
fifteen Republican members of Congress, and displace at least five to seven
of the seventeen congressional Democrats. 17 This partisan plan caused the
Democrats to flee.18
After passage of the legislative districting plan, public interest
organizations, congressmen, and voters immediately brought a suit
challenging the validity of the Texas plan in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. 19 The court found that the districting plan was
valid because plaintiffs failed to show any constitutional violation.20 The
plaintiffs appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,21 and the Supreme
Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, handed down six months prior to the Texas case.
22
In Vieth, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that partisan
gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable 23 because courts lacked
"judicially discernable and manageable standards" to measure such
claims.24 The Vieth plurality overruled the groundbreaking case of Davis v.
Bandemer,25 where the Court held that partisan gerrymandering presented a
justiciable equal protection issue.26 While Vieth appeared as an attempt to
close the judicial door on partisan gerrymandering claims, 27 the remand of
the Texas case indicates that the Supreme Court is not ready to put an end
to judicial review of partisan gerrymandering claims. The Court, however,
has failed to define the role that the judiciary should play in regulating
partisan redistricting. As a result, the questions of when and how the courts
15. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
16. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 12, at 1587.
17. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 471-72 (citation omitted).
18. Id.; see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 12, at 1588.
19. The plaintiffs claimed that the Texas Legislature violated Article I, Sections 2 and 4,
of the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1964 by drawing mid-decade districting lines, discriminating based on race in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and enacting a plan that was an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 457, 459-61.
20. Id.
21. See infra note 102.
22. Jackson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004) (mem.), vacating Session v. Perry, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex.). The Texas Court decided Session several months prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
23. See infra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of justiciability.
24. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (citation omitted).
25. 478 U.S. 109 (1986); see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
26. Davis, 478 U.S. at 109. The Court's holding of justiciability was praised by
commentators for "open[ing] to judicial review the only aspect of redistricting that had been
seemingly immune from judicial scrutiny, the intentional partisan gerrymander." Bernard
Grofman, Unresolved Issues in Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation, in Political
Gerrymandering and the Courts 1, 3 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
27. Herman Schwartz, Out With Gerrymanders!, The Nation, July 1, 2004,
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040719&s=schwartz.
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will measure the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims remain
unanswered.
While the Court's memorandum decision remanding the Texas case did
not include a rationale,28 it provided an indication that in the future, certain
partisan gerrymandering claims may warrant judicial intervention. The
direction the Supreme Court will take when presented with other partisan
gerrymandering claims remains unclear; the remand signaled a possible
willingness to give Vieth some teeth.29 The Supreme Court may be ready to
set broad guidelines to limit legislative districting, 30 or to hold that mid-
decade redistricting is unconstitutional. 31 The one thing that is clear is that
not all partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable.
Partisan gerrymandering raises questions about fundamental democratic
principles, 32 and whether or not the legislature is violating a constitutional
right. The "uniquely American practice of self-interested legislative
districting" 33 dates back to at least 1812,34 and courts have continually
looked at the practice with skepticism.35 While the practice is highly
contested, the sparse case law in this area of election law does not present
clear answers to address these pressing democratic concerns. 36
This Note argues that the First Amendment provides the most appropriate
standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims. Urging the
Supreme Court to adjudicate such claims, this Note seeks to define a
28. See Jackson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004) (mem.).
29. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting,
106 Yale L.J. 2505, 2554 n.157 (1997) [hereinafter Principled Limitations] ("While the
Constitution purportedly constrains partisan gerrymandering... courts have [not] given this
doctrine any teeth at all."); see also Hasen, supra note 3, at 626.
30. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 28, 70 (2004) [hereinafter Constitutionalization] ("Constitutional constraints
on excessive partisan gerrymandering might . .. lead to greater practical brakes on
gerrymandering than any constitutional law formally requires."); see also Principled
Limitations, supra note 29, at 2554 n.157 (quoting Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, No
Place of Partisan Gerrymandering, Tex. Law., Aug. 5, 1996, at 25 ("[Iln the wake of the
recent decisions limiting racial gerrymandering, the court might now feel an obligation to
take more seriously the similar problems that political gerrymandering poses.")).
31. See Mitchell Berman, Putting Fairness on the Map, L.A. Times, May 28, 2004, at
B15 (proposing that the court strike down all mid-decade redistricting plans "adopted by a
single-party-dominated legislature, unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest").
32. See, e.g., Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 Fla. L. Rev. 403,
407-10 (1993). But see Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1325, 1331 (1987) (refuting the
traditional critiques of gerrymandering: harms to political competition, structural fairness,
and fair representation).
33. Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 78.
34. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004); see generally Gary W. Cox &
Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the
Reapportionment Revolution 3 (2002).
35. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing judicial treatment of the gerrymander).
36. The Court has only given full consideration to two partisan gerrymandering cases.
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The Court has referred
to the practice in dicta since the 1960s. See infra Part I.B.3.
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"sounder and more prudential basis" 37 to measure partisan gerrymanders,
providing much needed guidance to lower courts.
Part I provides a framework for understanding the districting process.
Part L.A analyzes the goals of districting and the constraints placed on
legislatures when creating a districting plan. Part I.B presents a historical
analysis of judicial involvement in the districting process, discussing the
initial judicial entry into this area of election law, and then focusing
specifically on partisan gerrymandering claims. Part 11 examines the
current debates surrounding the role of the judiciary in partisan
gerrymandering, presenting commentators' arguments for and against
judicial regulation of the political process of gerrymandering. It then
presents support for the use of a First Amendment standard in the partisan
gerrymandering context.
Part III explores the benefits and drawbacks of both the equal protection
and First Amendment standards, arguing that the Court should adopt a
freedom of association analysis for partisan gerrymandering claims. The
freedom of association standard will allow courts to provide relief when
legislators create districting plans that discriminate against voters based on
their political affiliation, without serving any compelling purpose. This
Note concludes with a proposal of how courts could implement the free
association standard in a manner that allows state legislatures discretion in
the districting process, and protects individual rights.
I. DISTRICTING
This part explains the history of legislative districting practices in the
United States. Part I.A describes the legislative task of districting. Part
I.A.1 focuses on the tools employed to create a partisan gerrymander. Part
I.A.2 discusses the traditional criteria that guide legislators in the districting
process, the same criteria that courts use to evaluate districting plans. 38 Part
I.B explores the history of judicial involvement in districting claims,
starting with the "reapportionment revolution" of the 1960s and ending with
a discussion of the three Supreme Court cases that addressed partisan
gerrymandering in 2004.
A. The Legislative Role in Districting
This section will describe the legislative procedures that govern the
districting process. Part I.A.1 will discuss the goals of the districting
process, particularly partisan gerrymandering. Part I.A.2 will then present
the standards that guide legislative districting and aid judicial evaluation of
districting plans.
37. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38. This Note focuses on the standards referenced most frequently by the courts.
2005]
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1. Goals of Legislative Districting
Gerrymandering is one aspect of the task of districting-"[t]he practice
of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts. '39  After each
census, states must redistrict in order to delegate representatives by the
method of "equal proportions." 40  Once Congress reapportions
representatives to the states, the state legislators are responsible for drawing
internal district lines in accordance with the constitutional and statutory
standards discussed in Part I.A.2. 41
Gerrymandering, typically a pejorative term, occurs when legislators
redistrict to account for particular group interests.42  The term
"gerrymandering" refers generally to any act of "intentional alteration of
established political boundaries or the creation of artificial 'communities'
by the grouping of political units to form temporary election districts for the
purpose of effecting an election outcome." 43  Partisan or political
gerrymandering, on the other hand, is "[t]he practice of dividing a
geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to
give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition's
voting strength."'44
Recognition of definitional distinctions emphasizes that while every
district line affects partisan interests and voting blocs, 45 legislators do not
39. Black's Law Dictionary 919 (8th ed. 2004).
40. 2 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000). Each state receives one representative by constitutional
mandate. U.S Const. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. The reapportionment of the remainder of
representatives is regulated by 2 U.S.C. § 2(a)-(c). For the exact mathematical equations
used for reapportionment see Timothy P. Brennan, Cleaning Out the Augean Stables:
Pennsylvania's Most Recent Redistricting and a Call to Clean Up This Messy Process, 13
Widener L.J. 235, 242-44 (2003).
41. Both federal congressional districts and state legislative districts require legislative
redistricting. See Brennan, supra note 40, at 244 n.39, 257-58 (explaining that while
congressional districts are regulated by Article I, Section 2, and state districts are regulated
by the Equal Protection Clause, the courts review both using the equal protection doctrine).
42. See, e.g., Mark E. Rush, Does Redistricting Make a Difference? Partisan
Representation and Electoral Behavior 2 (1993).
43. Paul V. Niemeyer, The Gerrymander: A Journalistic Catch-word or Constitutional
Principle? The Case in Maryland, 54 Md. L. Rev. 242, 248 (1995).
44. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
696 (7th ed. 1999)). Partisan gerrymandering can be broken down into two types: (1) the
bipartisan gerrymander, where a state is divided into politically homogenous districts so that
each district favors a particular party and (2) the incumbent-protecting gerrymander, drawn
to favor a particular candidate, which can occur where the opponent is from the same, or a
different party, and is not reliant on other districts being drawn in favor of one party. See
Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 62-65 (2004) (explaining the two types of
gerrymander in depth). Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels,
116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 601-11 (2002), with Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes
Guarding Henhouses: The Case For Judicial Acquiescence To Incumbent-Protecting
Gerrymanders, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 661-64 (2002) (debating the severity of the harm
caused by the two types of gerrymander). This Note refers to partisan gerrymandering as
inclusive of both types because they have the same effect on the individual's right to
political association.
45. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative
Districts, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 7-8 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982);
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draw all district lines with the specific intent to increase or decrease the
power of a particular group of voters.46 Gerrymanders can serve to create
more "'politically fair"' results than might occur in an at-large election
(where the winner takes all) 47 because it accounts for preexisting
community boundaries and representation of minorities.48
Redistricting is necessary to ensure the equality promised by the Equal
Protection Clause and the one-person, one-vote standard.49 The process is,
however, often executed by legislators who have a vested interest in
election outcomes, and districting is likely to reflect partisan interests.50
Partisan gerrymandering allows "a party with only a minority of the popular
vote [to] assert control over a majority of seats in the state assembly and...
the national House of Representatives." 51 By creating "a majority party or
merely increas[ing] the majority's power, [a districting plan can secure] a
partisan imbalance so skillfully that the legislature" becomes unresponsive
to the will of the people they represent. 52
A successful partisan gerrymander has far-reaching effects.53 Beyond
creating favorable election results, a partisan gerrymander has the potential
to impact "the entire corpus of legislative decisions enacted in its train."54
This is particularly true in the congressional districting context, where
representatives can enact or alter federal law and national budgets.55
A partisan gerrymander aims to increase partisan advantage in as many
districts in a state as possible, "wasting" the maximum number of votes of
the opposition party as possible by "packing" and "cracking" districts.56
Legislators design partisan gerrymanders so that a "disadvantaged party
cf. Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the
Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 10 (1985) (stating that all district
lines have political impacts, but are only manipulative if there is an agreed upon standard of
political advantage and neutrality).
46. Rush, supra note 42, at 4-5 (discussing the role of "malicious intent" in
gerrymandering cases). For a discussion of the debate over whether any district lines can be
considered neutral, see infra Part ILA.
47. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986) (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, 752-53 (1973)).
48. Id. at 125 n.9 ("[N]onpartisan gerrymanders in fact are aimed at guaranteeing rather
than infringing [upon] fair group representation.").
49. Kristen Silverberg, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 Tex. L. Rev.
913, 913 (1996).
50. Id. ("[R]edistricting battles are rife with naked self-interest and partisanship;
principles of democracy are persistently abandoned to baser motives.").
51. Lewyn, supra note 32, at 407 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 407-08 (agreeing that gerrymandering causes these harms, and arguing that
partisan gerrymandering is an "unmitigated evil").
53. Niemeyer, supra note 43, at 248 (explaining that gerrymandering "sets aside the will
of the popular majority[; i]t is a species of fraud, deception, and trickery which menaces the
perpetuity of the Republic") (citation omitted).
54. Schuck, supra note 32, at 1327-31 (arguing that districting should be a legislative,
not judicial, task).
55. See id. at 1331-32.
56. See, e.g., Niemeyer, supra note 43, at 248.
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must poll more votes than the party in control of the districting process in
order to win a given percentage of the legislative seats. 57
Packing occurs when an over-concentration of a party is placed in a few
districts, creating a "supermajority" 58 in those districts but relegating the
party to a minority in other districts, in order to "waste" that party's votes
and limit the number of competitive districts.59 Packing leads to a lack of
competition within a district. 60 Cracking, on the other hand, is the division
of a political group into multiple districts to ensure that in each district the
members of that party constitute a minority. 61 A final gerrymandering tool
is "shacking," where either a representative's residence is drawn into a
district where her constituents do not reside, or two incumbents' residences
are placed in one district, leading to intense partisan competition. 62
The result of a successful partisan gerrymander is a lower margin of
victory in the favored party's seats than the margin in the disfavored party's
seats (so the opposing party's votes will count as little as possible).63
However, if legislators gerrymander incorrectly (that is, the redistricting
party miscalculates), the party that created the plan could suffer heavy
losses. For that reason, the efficient distribution of votes to seats may
involve making previously safe seats riskier, resulting in a "seats-security
trade-off., 64
With the advent of computer technology, legislators can slice states with
precision, relying on partisan interests such as race, age, and other census
data, to create multiple plans that incorporate particular voter indicators
with ever-increasing efficiency.65 Legislators can create districting plans
meticulously, block-by-block. 66 The practice of districting, which emerged
57. Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA
L. Rev. 77, 100 (1985) [hereinafter Criteria].
58. See Sessions v. Perry, 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D. Tex.), vacated sub nom. Jackson v.
Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).
59. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 40, at 246-48. In a single-member district, any votes
for the winning candidate in excess of fifty percent plus one are considered "wasted." See
Niemeyer, supra note 43, at 248.
60. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review
of Partisan Gerrymanders, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 552 (2004).
61. Silverberg, supra note 49, at 922.
62. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60, at 552-55.
63. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 768 (explaining that efficiency means lessening, and
inefficiency means increasing, the number of the opposition's "wasted" votes) (citation
omitted).
64. Id. at 768-69. But see Criteria, supra note 57, at 112-13 (explaining that a
"sophisticated gerrymander," created by computer, improves the ability to create a
gerrymander without risking trade-offs); Lewyn, supra note 32, at 409 (arguing that "a
sophisticated gerrymander can avoid such pitfalls by creating 'districts with a sufficient
cushion of [majority party] partisan sympathizers . . . to make the districts safe for that
party"') (quoting Criteria, supra note 57, at 156).
65. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 40, at 245-48.
66. Silverberg, supra note 49, at 924.
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to account for population shifts, 6 7 is now undertaken on political whim, and
the creation of partisan disadvantage is a primary goal.68
While views on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering differ,
there is little doubt that the process affects election results.69 Whether
partisan gerrymandering practices warrant judicial intervention depends,
however, on broader conceptions of the goals of effective representation
and the rights protected by the Constitution.70
2. Districting Criteria
When legislators create a districting plan, they are constrained by the
Constitution, Congressional legislation, and social science guidelines. This
section will lay out the relevant districting parameters in turn.
a. Constitutional Standards
The Constitution itself does not speak directly of districting guidelines.
Congressional districts are required to have equal populations based on
Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution.71 The Court has refined this
requirement over time, using the equal protection doctrine as a guide.72
The Supreme Court first adjudicated partisan gerrymandering claims in
1986, granting justiciability under the Equal Protection Clause, but no court
has ever provided relief to plaintiffs on equal protection grounds. 73 The
continual failure of equal protection to provide a judicial remedy in partisan
gerrymandering cases 74 opened the door for plaintiffs to pursue other
constitutional avenues for redress, particularly the First Amendment. 75
67. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 3. This does not mean that partisan advantage was not a
consideration in the past, just that the external limitations on success have changed. See
generally Cox & Katz, supra note 34.
69. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Political Gerrymandering and the Courts, supra note 26 (presenting
several scholars' views on the meaning of Bandemer, and theories underlying the Court's
gerrymandering jurisprudence); see also Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a
Federalism Injury, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1196, 1198 (2004) [hereinafter Federalism Injury]
(proposing that the court should focus not on individual representational or voting rights, but
on the negative effect that gerrymandering has on the federalist nature of our republic).
71. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2 (providing that
"[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers .... The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first
Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten
Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct").
72. See infra Part I.B.1.
73. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280 n.6, 281-82 (2004) (listing the lower court
cases that have addressed partisan gerrymandering).
74. It is important at the outset to differentiate the political gerrymander from the racial
gerrymander. The Court has adjudicated racial cases since holding that a gerrymandering
scheme in an Alabama city election violated the Fourteenth Amendment in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). For an in-depth comparison of the treatment of political and
racial gerrymandering claims see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court:
Gerrymandering, "Fair Representation" and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 Notre
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Vieth was the first Supreme Court case to discuss the applicability of the
First Amendment standard to partisan gerrymandering. 76 This standard
would measure the effect of a political gerrymander on a citizen's right to
"associate for the advancement of political beliefs."'77 The freedom of
association standard has not yet been adopted by any court,78 but it may
prove to be the best protection against partisan gerrymanders enacted purely
to disadvantage the opposing party at the polls. 79
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that states will govern
impartially by ensuring that government classifications are justified by
sufficient purpose, and that state bodies do not partake in invidious
discrimination. 80 This antidiscrimination principle ensures that similarly
situated people are treated in an equal manner81 and prohibits the
perpetuation of subordinate classes.82 Whenever the government draws
distinctions based on specific characteristics, or burdens a fundamental
right, the Equal Protection Clause applies.83
While the equal protection standard controls partisan gerrymandering
claims,84 plaintiffs in partisan gerrymandering suits consistently allege that
districting plans violate their First Amendment freedom of association.85
While no court has found a First Amendment violation to date, there is
Dame L. Rev. 527, 580-92 (2003) (discussing the application of the Voting Rights Act and
the strict scrutiny standards in racial gerrymandering cases). See generally David Lublin,
The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress
(1997) (analyzing the effect of the Voting Rights Act on racial representation in
congressional districts).
75. See infra note 85.
76. See infra Part I.B.3.
77. The remainder of this Note will refer to this right as the freedom to associate, the
right to associate, and political association.
78. See infra note 86.
79. See infra Part III.
80. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996).
81. 2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance
and Procedure 316-17 (1986).
82. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal
Protection Clause, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 35, 35 (2003).
83. Lewyn, supra note 32, at 429 (describing the characteristics that trigger equal
protection "such as race, alienage, or gender").
84. See infra Part I.B.3.
85. See, e.g., Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1992)
(dismissing a First Amendment challenge for failure to state a claim); Larios v. Cox, 300 F.
Supp. 2d 1320, 1357 (N.D. Ga.), affd, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2806 (2004) (granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim); O'Lear v. Miller, 222 F.
Supp. 2d 850, 860 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 537 U.S. 997 (2002) (dismissing First
Amendment claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim); Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 532, 548 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claim for failure to allege a First
Amendment cause of action); Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1174 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
(denying First Amendment violation because "[g]errymandering is concerned with dilution
of political influence through the manipulation of elective district boundaries, not with other
abuses of the electoral process or First Amendment violations"); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp.
392, 398 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (dismissing the First Amendment claim for failure to state a
claim); Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd., 488 U.S. 1024 (1989)
(dismissing the First Amendment claim).
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scholarly support for the role of the First Amendment in election law. 86
Justice Anthony Kennedy adopted the First Amendment standard for
partisan gerrymandering in Vieth, arguing that the First Amendment could
present a "functional" standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering
claims. 87
Justice Kennedy's freedom of association inquiry would focus on
whether the state used political classifications to burden a group's
representational rights. 88  If the state "penalize[s] citizens for their
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association
with a political party, or their expression of political views," the state must
show a compelling interest in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny. 89
The Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to associate, but
courts recognize free association as a fundamental right, integral to free
speech and assembly.90 Freedom to associate for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech, 91 whether the rights advanced by association are "political,
economic, religious or cultural." '92
The right to associate provides individuals the ability to join a party and
"to gain a voice" in choosing candidates. 93 The associational right is
central to protecting minorities who may express alternative, perhaps
86. See Martin, 980 F.2d at 959 n.29 (citing Michael A. Hess, Beyond Justiciability:
Political Gerrymandering After Davis v. Bandemer, 9 Campbell L. Rev. 207, 234 (1987)
("The most readily identifiable voting group is one based on political affiliation and voting
patterns."); Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights
Controversies, 52 Tenn. L. Rev. 549, 588-98 (1985); Harris Weinstein, Partisan
Gerrymandering: The Next Hurdle in the Political Thicket?, 1 J.L. & Pol. 357, 373 (1984)
(stating that political gerrymanders "strike at the heart of the rights of free speech and free
association" because they "are designed to limit the effectiveness of organized political
activity"); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First
Amendment Right of Association, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1209, 1239-60 (2003). But see Hasen,
supra note 3, at 633-38 (discussing the Vieth opinion and rejecting the claim that the First
Amendment will offer relief to plaintiffs in partisan gerrymandering).
87. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 314.
89. Id. at 314-15 (acknowledging that courts must also decide on a manageable standard
with which to measure the effect on apportionment).
90. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984) (recognizing that the
First Amendment, while not expressly containing a right of association, does protect certain
intimate human relationships, as well as the right to association for the purpose of engaging
in those expressive activities otherwise protected by the Constitution). There are two distinct
forms of the right to associate: intimate and expressive. Id.
91. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
92. Id. at 460-61 ("[lIt is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political" ideas; "state action which may have the effect of curtailing
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."). This Note will refer to the First
Amendment and the freedom of association synonymously.
93. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973) (striking down an Illinois statute
which prohibited voters from voting in one party's primary if they voted in the primary of




unpopular ideas. 94 "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association." 95 Without this protection, majority groups could impose their
will on others, monopolizing the "marketplace of ideas," 96 which underlies
our democratic system of governance. In 1974, the Court expressly held
that states must show a "compelling state interest" before burdening the
First Amendment rights of political parties or their members.97  The
Constitution provides broad guidelines to legislatures, but legislators are
bound by additional statutory and traditional social science criteria.
b. Statutory Standards
States are largely responsible for the districting process but Congress has
acted under its constitutional authority98 to regulate districting and prevent
legislative abuse of the process. 99 Currently, Congress requires only that
congressional districts be single-member districts. 100
Aside from setting districting requirements, Congress has also created
special procedures for the adjudication of redistricting and reapportionment
claims where the stakes are high and hasty resolution may be required to
ensure that districting plans are ready by election time. 10 1 The special
procedures include the availability of a three-judge panel to review every
statewide districting plan and appeal of panel decisions to the Supreme
Court. 10 2  Additionally, courts themselves have authority to create
94. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
95. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
96. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983); see Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S.
at 647-48; Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); see also Gregory P. Magarian,
Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights" First Amendment, 44 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1939, 1977 (2003) (discussing the need for active government intervention to protect
the marketplace and collective self-determination).
97. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S 724, 729-30 (1974).
98. Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides the following: "The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of ch[oo]sing Senators."
99. See Brennan, supra note 40, at 244 (explaining the history of congressional
districting regulation, which at times have required population equality, compactness, and
contiguity).
100. State legislative districts can be either multimember or single member. See id. at
265, 345. Each state may also adopt their own districting requirements. 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(2000). For relevant state constitutional provisions see Criteria, supra note 57, at 84-93.
Single-member plurality districts of representation ensure that some group of voters are
always denied representation because the system is premised on a winner-take-all result. See
Rush, supra note 42, at 3. While outside the scope of this Note, alternatives to the single-
member plurality scheme are discussed elsewhere. See generally Robert Alexander
Schwartz, The Nature of Consent in the American Republic: Substance or Procedure, 38
U.S.F. L. Rev. 467 (2004); see also Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 2551-52.
101. See Brennan, supra note 40, at 248.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000); see also J. Gerald Hebert et al., The Realist's Guide to
Redistricting: Avoiding the Legal Pitfalls, in Redistricting and Minority Representation:
Learning from the Past, Preparing for the Future 105, 106 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998).
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districting plans when legislators fail to act within the required time frame
for districting. 103
c. Social Science Criteria
While congressional districting involves few legal constraints, 104 courts
rely on past congressional legislation and social science standards as a
guide when evaluating district plans. 10 5 While it is clear that adherence to
the criteria described below does not prevent partisan gerrymandering,
traditional criteria can limit the partisan effect of gerrymanders and help
frame the appropriate judicial role in gerrymandering. 10 6 This section will
discuss three major categories of districting criteria: formal, result/outcome
oriented, and intent based. 107
Formal criteria evaluate districts in terms of political and physical
geography. 10 8 The first criterion, population equality, is constitutionally
required. 10 9 A second straightforward measure of districting is contiguity.
Contiguity occurs in districting when "every part of a district is reachable
from every other part without crossing the district boundary." 10 Contiguity
is a cornerstone of the district-based representation system, which relies on
the ability of representatives to reach all members of their constituency."'
Contiguity assures that a district is geographically unified. 112 Political
scientists agree with virtual unanimity that population equality and
contiguity serve as sound bases for district line drawing."l 3
A third formal criterion for districting is compactness. 114 Compactness
refers to the territorial shape of a district and while there is not one agreed
upon definition of compactness, compact districts are typically in the shape
103. See supra note 14.
104. James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims, 3 Election L.J. 643, 647 (2004) (suggesting that state courts are an appropriate place
to begin the judicial fight against partisan gerrymandering because state constitutions refer
explicitly to elections, while the federal "Constitution... has comparatively little to say").
105. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S 267 (2004); see also Martin Shapiro,
Gerrymandering, Unfairness and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 227, 249-51 (1985)
(discussing the role of prominent social scientist Bernard Grofman as an expert witness in
districting litigation).
106. For the debate regarding the ability of courts to apply these standards in a politically
neutral manner, see infra Part II.A.
107. This tripartite classification is adopted from Criteria, supra note 57, at 77-152. Each
social scientist defines the criteria slightly differently. The definitions here are based on a
synthesis of several articles. See id.; Lewyn, supra note 32, at 464-75; Lowenstein &
Steinberg, supra note 45, at 12-64.
108. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 12.
109. The precise mathematical deviation has changed over time. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
110. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 84.
111. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 21.
112. See, e.g., Criteria, supra note 57, at 84.
113. Id.
114. See Lewyn, supra note 32, at 465-68.
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of a square or circle.1 15 Though there is no consensus on the role of the
compactness standard, courts continue to look at this standard when
evaluating gerrymanders,1 16 but generally decline to strike down districting
plans under this measure unless there are severe departures from
compactness in several districts. 117
A fourth formal criterion used to measure gerrymanders is respect for
political subdivisions and communities of interest. 118 This measure of
districting requires that line drawers take into account county lines,
neighborhoods and common political and economic interests.1 19 This is the
one criterion that the Supreme Court has permitted to justify district
deviation from population equality. 120
Courts also use intent-based criteria that focus on the process by which
legislators created a districting plan, and look beyond the location of district
lines. 121  The first intent-based measure is incumbent advantage.
Incumbent advantage looks to two different indicia: 122 treatment of the
controlling party's incumbents and treatment of the opposing party's
incumbents. 123 Under this measure, the extent to which the incumbents of
one party are paired against each other, or robbed of their past constituents,
serves as evidence of pure partisan motives. 124 A second intent-based
measure is partisan fairness, or the absence of partisan bias, which defies
precise definition but relates closely to the treatment of incumbents. 125
Results/outcome-oriented criteria include competitiveness and vote-seat
ratios. Competitiveness measures the number of closely contested races
between members of the two major parties per district, such that it is very
difficult to predict a winner.126 Competitiveness is specific to individual
115. Compare Criteria, supra note 57, at 84-85, with Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note
45, at 22-27.
116. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986).
117. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 86, 91 (arguing that there is a tenuous relationship
between compactness and political gerrymandering).
118. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 28.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 27-28, 28 n.75 (citing Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983)) (arguing
against the validity of the standard as a public interest criterion).
121. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 99-117; see also Lewyn, supra note 32, at 468-69.
122. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 106-07.
123. Id. at 115-16.
124. See id. (treating opponents negatively is wrong because displacing incumbents in the
opposing party is one of the most effective tactics of gerrymandering; by using names and
records an incumbent can protect seats in the opposing party's territory). But see
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 45-46 (arguing that general anti-incumbent bias is
arbitrary because favoring a challenger would also lead to a skew in results, and there is no
neutral effect).
125. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 108-09; see also Cox, supra note 12, at 755-56
(arguing that partisan fairness, not just population equality, was the goal of redistricting
jurisprudence and that Bandemer "constitutionalized" this concern for fairness).
126. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 37; see also Criteria, supra note 57, at
152.
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politicians and particular elections. 127  According to this criterion, the
creation of "safe seats," where the district is engineered so that a particular
candidate will win the election without much of a contest, could be
evidence of improper partisan motive. 128 If districts are not competitive,
then even very large changes in vote percentages for the major parties may
not lead to a change in which a party gains seats. 129
The second results-based criterion is the ratio of a party's vote share as
compared to the seat share won in an election. 130 Social scientists can
measure a vote/seats ratio in two ways: by proportionality or by
symmetry. 131 These measures look at the state plan as a whole, not at
particular districts, and present the distinct problem of deciding how courts
can count voting strength. 132 One example-proportional representation-
occurs when the percentage of party members in the electorate is equal to
the percentage of the party in the state. 133
A final measure of districting incorporates all three broader
classifications in a "totality of the circumstances" test, which requires
courts to look at contours, compactness, political boundaries, intent,
process, and impact to measure the validity of the district plan at issue. 134
This test requires courts to balance legislative goals with fairness in the
process, intent, and outcome of a districting plan. 135
Bound by the aforementioned constraints, legislators seek to create
districts that preserve, or expand, their political power. Originally, the
highly political nature of districting kept the Supreme Court from
adjudicating claims that certain districts violated individual constitutional
127. See Persily, supra note 44, at 663-64 (claiming that competitiveness is not correlated
to gerrymandering). There are two measures of the competitiveness criterion: weak and
strong. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 37-40 (arguing both why this standard
is difficult for the judiciary to apply in a coherent manner and may even thwart the goal of
political stability). But see Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 74, at 577-79 (explaining why
maintaining competitiveness is important to our national system of governance).
128. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 171.
129. Id. at 151-52.
130. Id. at 149-53; see also Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 49-60.
131. No court has adopted the measure of symmetry. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In 'Vieth',
Court Continues to Misunderstand Gerrymandering, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 2004, at 4. For a
definition of this criterion and a call for the Court to adopt symmetry, see id. at 7.
132. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 49-51; see also discussion infra
Part II.A. on the ability of courts to measure partisan voting strength.
133. The Supreme Court has rejected proportional representation as a constitutional right.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288-89 (2004); see also Criteria, supra note 57, at 12-53.
While not mandating proportional representation, courts have allowed it as a legitimate state
goal in districting. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
134. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 174-85 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Gordon E. Baker, The Totality of the Circumstances Test, in Political
Gerrymandering and the Courts, supra note 26, at 203-11;.
135. See Lewyn, supra note 32, at 470-71 (arguing that this test is vague and
unworkable). But see Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects
Baseline, in Political Gerrymandering and the Courts, supra note 26, at 145-70 (discussing
the success of this test in racial gerrymandering cases).
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rights. The Court declined to hear such cases, declaring districting claims
to be non-justiciable, as detailed in this part.
B. The Judicial Role in Districting
This Part provides a chronological analysis of the Court's role in the
regulation of districting. Part I.B.1 discusses the Court's initial refusal to
enter the districting arena, and presents the justiciability doctrine, which
plays a prominent role in the current debate over partisan gerrymandering
claims. Part I.B.2 describes the growth of the one-person, one-vote
standard for district apportionment. This history provides guidance for the
discussion of the appropriate role of the courts in partisan gerrymandering
presented in Part II, and a basis for the freedom of association standard
advocated in Part H. The early districting cases frequently refer to the
harms of partisan gerrymandering and serve as the basis for the equal
protection standard that currently controls partisan gerrymandering. Part
I.B.3 goes on to explain the current state of partisan gerrymandering in both
the Supreme Court and several federal courts.
1. Justiciability
The Supreme Court originally declined to enter the political area of
districting in 1946, holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction over
districting and the issue was non-justiciable. 136
Justiciability encompasses several judicially created doctrines, which are
derived from one of two sources: interpretations of Article HI, Section 2, of
the Constitution, and prudent judicial administration. 137 These two sources
of justiciability doctrines are closely related to separation of powers, 138
which dictates "the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power" to ensure that courts do not "intrude into areas committed to other
branches of government." 139
There are five justiciability doctrines that determine which cases federal
courts may hear and decide, and which cases the courts must dismiss: 140
136. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that districting claims were
not justiciable under the Guaranty Clause and the regulation of time, place, and manner of
elections was left to legislative branches). Colegrove warned against judicial involvement in
the "political thicket" of districting because "[t]he Constitution has left the performance of
many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and
legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political
rights." Id.
137. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 42 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that the
Constitution's textual description of the nine categories of "cases" and "controversies"
imposes limits on the federal judiciary and that the Supreme Court has interpreted the text to
create the justiciability doctrines).
138. See id. at 43.
139. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 66-67 (2d ed. 1988).
140. See Chemerinsky, supra note 137, at 42. For an in-depth discussion of each
justiciability doctrine, see id. at 42-166.
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the prohibition against advisory opinions, 14 1 standing, 142 ripeness, 143
mootness, 144 and the political question doctrine.145
The political question doctrine, implicated in the districting context,
refers to subject matter that the Supreme Court finds inappropriate for
judicial review, even when a case meets all the other requirements of
justiciability.146  In essence, the political question doctrine is one of
institutional competence, which prevents the court from deciding cases
where other branches have superior expertise, and maintains the Court's
political legitimacy.' 47
The most quoted language describing the political question doctrine is
found in Baker v. Carr,148 the seminal case in which the Supreme Court
refuted the reasoning of Colegrove v. Green149 and entered the "political
thicket" of districting. 150  Baker v. Carr provided that courts could not
adjudicate cases when any of the following factors were present:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 5 1
2. Apportionment: One Person, One Vote
The Supreme Court began adjudicating districting as a response to the
failure of southern state legislators to redraw districts in light of new census
141. See id. at 47 (stating that this doctrine prohibits federal courts from "provid[ing]
opinions about the constitutionality of pending legislation or on constitutional questions
referred to them by other branches of government"). There is no such prohibition on state
courts. Id.
142. See id. at 54 (defining standing as a determination of "whether the litigant is entitled
to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues").
143. See id. at 114 (describing ripeness as a "doctrine [which] seeks to separate matters
that are premature for review because the injury is speculative and never may occur, from
those cases appropriate for federal court action") (citations omitted)).
144. See id. at 125 (referring to mootness as the "doctrine of standing in a time frame,"
which requires that an actual controversy must exist at all stages of litigation).
145. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
146. See Chemerinsky, supra note 137, at 142.
147. See id. at 146.
148. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
149. 328 U.S. 549 (1946); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 136.
151. Baker, 369 U.S. at 216-17.
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data. 152 Failure to redistrict left states with districts in which urban centers
held the majority of the population while rural communities received the
most representatives. 53
By declaring legislative districting claims justiciable in Baker,154 the
Court began the "Reapportionment Revolution." 155 Baker announced that
just because a claim "seeks protection of a political right does not mean it
presents a political question."'156 While finding jurisdiction over plaintiff's
equal protection claim, Baker did not articulate a standard for measuring
unconstitutional apportionment. 157  Baker also did not set up a clear
standard for the role of courts in districting. 158 The Baker Court did,
however, create some guidelines for districting: Legislators must redraw
districts at a minimum after each census and approve court involvement in
refashioning districts when the state legislators fail to act. 159
Only two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court enunciated the "one-
person, one-vote" standard as a constitutional requirement for districting. 160
Affirming justiciability, the Reynolds Court held that "the Equal Protection
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable."' 61
The Court would allow population deviations as long as legislators justified
the deviations with legitimate state concerns. 162 The Court declared that the
goal of apportionment was "fair and effective representation," and "full and
effective participation in [the] political processes of [every citizen's] State's
legislative bodies." 163
Within two years of Baker, the Court also acknowledged the justiciability
of congressional districting claims. 164 The Court found justification for
adjudication of these districting claims not in the Equal Protection Clause,
but in Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution, holding that "[w]hile it may
not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision,
that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making
152. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540 (1964) (explaining that Alabama's
state districting plan remained untouched for years and the court stepped in to define an
exact standard for measuring constitutionality of the vote dilution claim); Baker, 369 U.S. at
193 (discussing the Tennessee legislature's refusal to reapportion congressional districts
between 1901 and 1961).
153. See, e.g., Criteria, supra note 57, at 80-81.
154. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
155. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 755.
156. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
157. Brennan, supra note 40, at 255-57.
158. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining that the arbitrary and capricious standard articulated in Baker, almost proved
unmanageable).
159. See supra note 14.
160. Renolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
161. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 74, at 558 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577).
162. Id.
163. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
164. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
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equal representation."' 16 5 The Court, in Wesberry v. Sanders,166 reasoned
that if the vote of a person in one district weighed more than the vote of
someone in another district, elections would violate fundamental
democratic principles, including election "by the People."' 167 Federal
districts must reach population equality "as nearly as is practicable" to
ensure one vote was worth as much as another, 168 recognizing that "[n]o
right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live."' 69
The one-person, one-vote standard protects individuals and ensures that
registered voters have the right to cast a vote that has equal value.170 While
the original districting cases focused on mathematical equality and
individual claims for "fair and effective representation," it is clear that the
Court had concerns that equally populated districts alone could not prevent
constitutionally infirm elections.
Reynolds recognized that limits on apportionment were only one step
towards protecting voters' rights, as the "opportunities for [partisan]
gerrymandering are greatest when there is freedom to construct unequally
populated districts."' 171 The Court noted, however, that by allowing non-
compact, noncontiguous districts, there was "an open invitation to partisan
gerrymandering."1 72
As the Court refined the equality standard, concerns over partisan
gerrymandering continued to play a role in judicial decisions. In Fortson v.
Dorsey,173 the Court stated that while a plan may reach population equality,
plaintiffs could present a viable constitutional challenge by showing the
plan "would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population."' 174
In 1969, the Court articulated a strict population standard for evaluating
apportionment claims of congressional districts, rejecting a de minimis
variance as inconsistent with "as nearly as practicable" language of Article
I, Section 2, of the Constitution and equal protection principles. 175
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler stands for the idea that precise population equality is
165. Id. at 18. The Court has strictly adhered to population equality in congressional
districting, but has been more lenient in state districting plans. See Criteria, supra note 57, at
83.
166. 376 U.S. at 1.
167. Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 7-8.
169. Id. at 17-18.
170. See id.
171. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534 n.4 (1969).
172. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,578-79 (1964).
173. 379 U.S. 433 (1965)
174. Id. at 439 (failing to address how courts would measure such a challenge in the
future).
175. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530.
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necessary in order to avoid the "debasement of voting power" and secure
"effective access" to representatives. 176
The Kirkpatrick Court rejected the state's rationales for deviation from
population equality, 177 but acknowledged that population shifts could
justify deviations if the state was making a "good-faith effort" to reach
equal apportionment. 178 The Court rejected population deviations that were
justified solely by the state goal of protecting group interests. 179
In concurrence, Justice Abe Fortas defined gerrymandering and noted
that the one-person, one-vote standard could serve as "political cover" for
incumbent protection gerrymandering. 180 Justice Fortas would therefore
allow population deviations only if it was clear that there was no evidence
of gerrymandering. 18 1  The dissent noted that "precise adherence to
admittedly inexact census figures... downgrade[s] a restraint on a far
greater potential threat to equality of representation, the gerrymander."' 182
A majority of the Court spoke on partisan gerrymandering in 1973.
Gaffney v. Cummings upheld a districting plan drawn in an attempt to
guarantee parties "rough" proportional representation in the state
legislature. 183 The Court held that the plan was constitutional because there
was a good faith effort to reach population equality. 184 Gafftiey was one of
the few occasions that the Court recognized protection of a group right to
representation as legitimate, 185 and set forth a criterion of "political
fairness" for districting.186 The Court directly addressed the use of partisan
gerrymandering, but did not base its decision on that ground, finding
instead that the Court's discretion to intervene is at its "lowest ebb" when
legislators apportion fairly. 187
In Karcher v. Daggett,t88 the Court partook in the "backdoor invalidation
of a [congressional district] gerrymander."' 189  The Court supplied
additional guidance and flexibility to the apportionment standard from
176. Id.
177. Id. at 530-31 (laying out the state's rationales: preserving areas of interest,
accommodating legislative compromise, avoiding fragmentation of political entities, and
compactness).
178. Id. at 537 (Fortas, J., concurring).
179. Calhoun, supra note 86, at 596.
180. See Silverberg, supra note 49, at 932.
181. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 537-40 (Fortas, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 555 (White, J., dissenting).
183. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 738 (1973).
184. Id. at754.
185. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119-20 (1986). But see id. at 144, 153
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the plurality's reliance on Gaffney).
186. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 735; see also Baker, supra note 134, at 18 (discussing the
importance of considering political fairness in districting plans).
187. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 154.
188. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
189. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 74, at 559 (internal quotation omitted) (explaining that
while the Court relied on population deviation to find the districting plan unconstitutional,
the Court was concerned with the process, in which Democrats maintained complete control,
evincing their partisan intent).
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Kirkpatrick, creating a two-step test for measuring a congressional district's
adherence to Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution. 190 The Court required
plaintiffs to show that a district plan existed in which legislatures, through a
good faith effort to achieve equality, could have reduced or eliminated
population differences. 191 If the plaintiff showed that the deviations were
not part of a good faith effort, then the burden shifted to the state to prove
the variance was necessary to reach a legitimate goal. 192
In Karcher, five Justices expressed a "constitutionally-based concern
about gerrymandering without directly addressing the issue." 193  In
concurrence, Justice John Paul Stevens proffered the first judicial standard
to measure the constitutionality of a partisan gerrymander. 194  If a
districting plan included invidious partisan gerrymandering and an absence
of good faith legislative action, the Court should strike the plan down. 195
Justice Stevens' test required plaintiffs to show that: (1) they were part of a
salient class whose distribution was sufficiently ascertainable to be taken
into account in drawing boundaries; (2) proportionate voting influence had
been adversely affected either in relevant districts, or in the state as a whole;
and (3) plaintiffs had to make a prima facie showing of adverse impacts,
and raise a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. 196 Justice Stevens
stated that the one-person, one-vote standard did not protect group rights,197
identifying a group claim to discrimination, which opened the door for
future adjudication based on membership in a political party. 198
3. Partisan Gerrymandering Cases
Just three years after Karcher, the Court granted full consideration to the
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering, the practice so often
disparaged in dicta.199 In Davis v. Bandemer, members of the Indiana State
Democratic Party brought suit alleging that the 1981 districting plan of the
Indiana State House of Representatives violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the Republican legislators intentionally created a statewide
190. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730-31.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 731.
193. Niemeyer, supra note 43, at 256; see also Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at
1-3.
194. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 754-56.
196. Id. at 754-55.
197. Id. at 750-52.
198. Brennan, supra note 40, at 264.
199. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Prior to Bandemer, the Court summarily
affirmed non-justiciability of partisan gerrymandering cases. See, e.g., WMCA Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965) (per curiam), vacated, 384 U.S. 887 (1966). Though Bandemer
was a long-awaited decision in the election field, the importance of the decision was
overlooked by many because the decision was handed down on the same day as Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). Daniel H. Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering
and Equal Protection in Political Gerrymandering and the Courts, supra note 26, at 64.
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plan purely to disadvantage Democrats and dilute the power of Democrats'
votes. 200
The Indiana plan, created under a Republican Governor and Republican-
dominated State Legislature,201 largely excluded Democratic legislative
involvement. Democrats had no voting power on the conference committee
that developed the scheme and were denied access to the Republican-
funded study of the effects of each computer-generated program.20 2
The district court, relying on the three-prong test presented by Justice
Stevens in Karcher,20 3 held that the plaintiff's claim was justiciable and that
the districting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. 20 4 The plaintiffs,
Democratic Party members, proved that they were "members of a
politically salient class" and that "their proportionate voting influence was
adversely affected. '20 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that partisan
gerrymandering constituted a justiciable equal protection question.20 6
While a majority of the Justices agreed on reversal of the district court
decision, only four Justices approved of the plurality's standard for
identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. 207
Writing for the plurality, Justice Byron White rejected the finding that
Democratic voters failed to show the requisite "unconstitutional vote
dilution" across the state as a whole.20 8 Justice White created a two-prong
test that required the challenger to prove that the legislature intentionally
discriminated "against an identifiable political group" and that the
districting plan resulted in a "discriminatory effect on that group." 209 In
order to violate the Constitution on a statewide basis, a districting plan must
200. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127. According to the districting plan, the State Senate and
House districts were redrawn in 1981 and an election was held in 1982 where Democrats
received 51.9% of the vote, but elected only forty-three of the one hundred house seats. The
three-judge district panel invalidated the plan on the basis that it "diluted" the Democratic
vote, and the defendants appealed. Id. at 113-15. For a detailed factual history of Bandemer,
see Hess, supra note 86. See generally Political Gerrymandering and the Courts, supra note
26.
201. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1482-83 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S.
109 (1986).
202. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 32, at 1332.
203. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
204. Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1479-80.
205. Id. at 1492-93 (focusing on the shape of districts, the role of traditional districting
standards, and the use of "stacking" and "splitting" techniques) (citations omitted).
206. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986). The vote was 6-3 to grant
justiciability and 7-2 to reverse the lower court invalidation of the plan decision. However,
the Court did not produce a majority opinion. Grofman, supra note 26, at 3. The decision
did not address bipartisan gerrymandering, only pure partisan districting. Id. at 6.
207. Justice White presented an approach adopted from racial gerrymandering cases.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127 (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980)).
208. Id. at 131-32.
209. Id. at 127. While six Justices agreed that a two-prong test was appropriate, the
Justices could not agree on the factors necessary to prove either prong. Compare id. with id.
at 161-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole."210
The plurality test required plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of
"unconstitutional vote dilution" in order to establish a "continued
frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a
minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process. '211
Once a challenger demonstrated discriminatory effects, the Court would
review the legislative intent.212 The Indiana Democrats failed to show the
discriminatory effect, and the presence of discriminatory intent alone was
not sufficient to invalidate the Indiana districting plan. 2 13 "[I]ntentional
drawing of district boundaries for partisan ends and for no other reason
does not violate equal protection" if discriminatory effects are not
proven. 214 The Court rejected the idea that equal protection required that
"each political group . . . should have the same chance to elect
representatives of its choice." 215 While partisan intent was present, the
plaintiffs failed to show the required discriminatory effects to sustain a
constitutional violation.216 The plaintiffs' reliance on just one election
failed to meet the requirements of the effects prong.21 7
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, which Chief
Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist joined,2 18 finding that
partisan gerrymandering constituted a political question, and refuting the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims. 219 Citing the "nebulous
standard" of the plurality, 220 Justice O'Connor found that the nature of the
problem meant that no bright-line rule was possible.221
210. Id. at 132-33 (plurality opinion). Justice White outlined differing tests for statewide
and district-wide claims. For a district, the "inquiry focuses on the opportunity of members
of the group to participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates,
their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly influence the
election returns and to secure the attention of the winning candidate." Id. For a statewide
claim, "the inquiry centers on the voters' direct or indirect influence on the elections of the
state legislature as a whole." Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 134.
213. Id. at 141-42.
214. Id. at 138.
215. Id. at 124.
216. Id. at 135.
217. Id. But see id. at 169 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Though effects on election results do not suffice to establish an unconstitutional
gerrymander, they certainly are relevant to such a claim, and they may suffice to show that
the claimants have been injured by the redistricting they challenge.").
218. Id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 144-45. See infra Part II for further insight into the debates on the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering.
220. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145.
221. Id. at 152-55 (stating that partisan gerrymanders are self correcting because district
lines are redrawn every decade and people move, change affiliation, and do not always vote
along party lines). Additionally, the uncertainty involved in line drawing demonstrated that
districting is a "self-limiting enterprise." Id.
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Justice O'Connor chastised the majority for applying the group-rights
standard employed in racial gerrymandering cases to the political context
because the considerations differed fundamentally. 222 The Equal Protection
Clause does not provide a "group right to an equal share of political
power," 223 and to recognize such a right would require that districts reflect
proportional representation. 224 Adjudication of these claims would lead to
every identifiable group claiming a right to proportional representation. 225
The individual right to an equally weighted vote, which the Court protected
in the early reapportionment cases, did not lead to relief here.226
Members of the Democratic and Republican Parties can hardly claim to
be "shut out of the political process," 227 as they dominate the system, and
any act of gerrymandering risks the success of one party, at the potential
gain of its opposing party.228
Additionally, the Court found that the Democratic claim of statewide
dilution did not encompass an actual harm to an individual in any particular
district.229 Finally, "'the impossible task of extirpating politics from what
are the essentially political processes of the sovereign States"' meant that
courts should not partake in the regulation of partisan districting. 230
Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote an opinion
agreeing with the finding of justiciability, but in contrast to the plurality,
Justice Powell found that the Indiana plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause.231 While the majority opinion offered a standard that could protect
individuals, the majority standard failed to protect group rights
adequately. 232 Members of a losing party need protection because these
voters will lack the same influence over state government that winning
party members will attain.233 The essence of the gerrymandering claim is
222. Id. at 151, 156-61 (arguing that racial standards are inapplicable because race is
immutable, there is specific protection from racial discrimination provided in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and, finally, that race, unlike politics, is not a necessary part of the
political/election trade).
223. Id. at 150 (While "'the right .. to vote draws much of its significance from...
political associations,"' that does not translate into a constitutional group right to
representation. (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78-79 (1980)).
224. Id. at 145.
225. Id. at 147.
226. Id. at 149.
227. Id. at 152 (citing the plurality opinion).
228. See id. at 156 (explaining that political parties have shifting membership, and people
do not always vote along party lines).
229. Id. at 153.
230. Id. (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973)).
231. Id. at 162 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on the
definition of gerrymandering set forth in Justice Fortas's concurrence in Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969), stating that gerrymandering is "the deliberate and
arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political
purposes").
232. Id. at 171 (citing Justice Stevens's concurrence in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
752 (1983) (criticizing the power of the one-person, one-vote standard as a measure for
group voting rights)).
233. Id. at 169-70.
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that members of a particular party have been "denied their right to 'fair and
effective representation.' "234
Unlike Justice White, Justice Powell approved of an initial inquiry into
legislative intent, and found that adherence to the one-person, one-vote
standard was not enough to validate a partisan gerrymandering claim.235
Population equality alone was a necessary, but not sufficient, component of
a constitutional districting plan.2 36
Justice Powell framed the constitutional question as whether Indiana
violated the Equal Protection Clause by adopting a plan "designed solely to
preserve the power of the dominant political party." 237 Justice Powell set
up an intent and effects test, which measured whether the plan served any
purpose aside from favoring one segment of the community over others.238
If the state presented no legitimate purpose, but simply "purposefully
discriminate[d]" against opposing parties, the plan violated equal
protection. 239 Justice Powell focused on "fairness" and set out five factors
to guide a judge's inquiry into the fairness of a districting plan: numerical
evidence of dilution, shape of districts, adherence to political subdivisions,
legislative procedures used to adopt the plan, and legislative history of the
redistricting plan. 240 This test would enable courts to differentiate between
the acceptable practice of districting for partisan advantage and an
unconstitutional gerrymandering. 241 Justice Powell also found that courts
would not need more than one set of election results to find a constitutional
violation. 242 Unlike the plurality, Justice Powell would not set a strict
requirement that plaintiffs directly establish "invidious intent" or "a history
of disproportionate results." 243
Justice Powell criticized the plurality for focusing almost exclusively on
one-person, one-vote, which resulted in the validation of "grotesquely
gerrymandered" districts.244 Justice Powell highlighted the importance of
reviewing the legislative process, which excluded Democrats, excluded
public participation, and focused purely on partisan advantage. 245
According to Powell, because equal protection requires that the state govern
impartially, the state must treat all voters the same when drawing district
lines, regardless of the voters' beliefs. 246
234. Id. at 162 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)).
235. Id. at 168.
236. See id. at 168 n.5.
237. Id. at 161.
238. See id. at 174-75.
239. Id. at 174.
240. Id. at 173. The majority opinion criticized these factors and rejected intent alone as
insufficient to prove an equal protection violation. Id. at 138-39.
241. Id. at 165.
242. Id. at 175-78 (discussing the factors that would warrant finding that a districting plan
was unconstitutional).
243. Id. at 173 n.10.
244. Id. at 162.
245. ld. at 162-63, 165.
246. Id. at 166.
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Powell's concurrence explained that it was inappropriate to put the
burden of proving intentional discrimination on the plaintiffs where there
was direct proof of legislative intent.247 However, in order to prevent
judicial entanglement in an arena of such political consequence, the Court
should impose a heavy burden on gerrymandered plaintiffs while striking
down plans where a totality of the circumstances revealed the
discriminatory purpose of the legislature.248 Justice Powell concluded that
because the Indiana Legislature failed to justify the discriminatory aspects
of the plan-not even offering a rational explanation aside from population
equality-the Court should find a violation of equal protection. 249
Bandemer set a very high standard for invalidation of partisan
gerrymanders, explaining that the harm must be "sufficiently serious to
require intervention," 250 but the plurality opinion did not reveal any clear
guidelines for measuring constitutional violations.251  The multiple
opinions, however, did establish that the "power to influence the political
process is not limited to winning elections." 252 The decision "created a
group right to a meaningful and undiluted vote," recognizing that "each
political group in a State should have the same chance . . . to elect
representatives of its choice" as any other political group. 253
For the eighteen years after Bandemer, no court found a constitutional
violation using the plurality's standard.254 On occasion, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed lower court decisions finding partisan gerrymandering
non-justiciable, and the lower courts were left with very little guidance on
how to proceed in this politicized area.255  Bandemer was read as
"recondite" 256 and criticized for "serv[ing] as an invitation to litigation
without much prospect of redress" 257 and causing "only confusion."258 In
fact, plaintiffs pursuing a partisan gerrymandering claim received relief in
only one gerrymandering case between 1986 and 2004.259
While several lower courts applied the Bandemer standard, which
requires a showing that voter influence over the political process was
"consistently degrade[d], ' 260 no court has come up with a widely accepted
247. Id. at 171 n.9-10 (describing the plurality's reliance on racial cases as erroneous,
because in racial cases, the intent is not overt, as it is in partisan gerrymandering).
248. Id. at 184-85.
249. Id. at 184.
250. Id. at 134.
251. See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
252. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
253. Brennan, supra note 40, at 265 n.17, 267 (citation omitted).
254. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 n.5, 280 n.6, 287 n.8 (2004) (citing all the
cases where claims for relief were rejected); see also Cox, supra note 12, at 798.
255. See Brennan, supra note 40, at 293.
256. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
257. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60, at 550 (citation omitted).
258. Id.; see also Edward Still, The Hunting of the Gerrymander: Political
Gerrymandering and the Courts, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1019, 1020 (1991).
259. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 n.5 (explaining that the one case was for judicial
elections, not for state or congressional representatives).
260. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
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definition of this effects prong.261  The controlling interpretation of
Bandemer emerged in a district court decision in California, summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court.262
In Badham v. Eu, the district court applied the Bandemer standard to a
claim that the California reapportionment plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause and the First Amendment. 263
The Badham court denied relief under the Equal Protection Clause claim
and dismissed the plaintiffs First Amendment challenge, finding that the
party was not precluded from fielding candidates because while "the First
Amendment guarantees the right to participate in the political process, it
does not guarantee political success." 264
The court denied relief because there was no showing of consistent
degradation of Republican voter influence on the political process.2 65 The
court found that the claim failed because the districting plan did not deny
Republicans the ability to register voters, organize, fundraise, or
campaign. 266 The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a "'strong indicia of lack
of political power and the denial of fair representation"' and therefore,
could not prove a Constitutional violation.267 Unless a majority party
shows it has effectively been unable to participate in the political process at
all, the court would not strike down a districting plan.268 Badham is
important because, as one commentator recently concluded, post-Badham
courts may not strike down a gerrymander against a major party in the
absence of a First Amendment violation. 269
261. See, e.g., Lewyn, supra note 32, at 443. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 199,
at 64-116.
262. See Lewyn, supra note 32, at 439-40. For alternate interpretations of the meaning of
Bandemer, compare Grofman, supra note 26, at 29-64 (understanding the plurality test to
require intentionally severe discrimination and long-lasting effects), with Lowenstein, supra
note 199, at 64-116 (interpreting the decision to preclude majority parties from ever
establishing an equal protection violation).
263. Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1998). Badham has been criticized as "a
complete misreading" of Bandemer "and a violation of common sense." Grofman, supra
note 26, at 50-51; see also Federalism Injury, supra note 70, at 1207 ("While most criticism
has focused on the Badham court's transformation of Bandemer's reasoning into a standard
that eventually foreclosed any successful claims of partisan gerrymandering, surprisingly
little attention has been paid to how Bandemer's holding was extended by Badham to the
context of congressional elections.").
264. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 675. The court found no indication that Republican views
were ignored by Representatives. Id. at 670-73.
265. Id. at 669-70.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986)).
268. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.N.C 1992), aff'd mem., 506 U.S. 801
(1992).
269. Lewyn, supra note 32, at 440. But see Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1174
(W.D. Tex. 1993) (rejecting the Badham court's focus on the First Amendment violations
because "[glerrymandering is concerned with dilution of political influence through the




The inability of the Court to identify a concrete measure for
unconstitutional gerrymanders has left legislators "unchecked" in their
districting practices. 270 Gerrymandering thus became more precise, and
criticism from the domestic and international community mounted against
this "uniquely American practice of self-interested redistricting."'2 7 1
Possibly as a response to political pressure, or as a reaction to mounting
media attention, 272 the Supreme Court put Bandemer to the test and agreed
to give full consideration to a second partisan gerrymandering claim in
Vieth v. Jubelirer.
273
Vieth arose from challenges to the Pennsylvania congressional districting
plan drawn up after the 2000 census. 274 In 2000, Pennsylvania's population
shifted.275 As a result, the number of Pennsylvanian Congresspersons was
reduced from twenty-one to nineteen, and the Pennsylvania State
Legislature embarked on a new redistricting plan. 276
Despite the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania Legislature, in 2000
Pennsylvania actually had a closely divided electorate. 277 Republicans also
controlled the U.S. House of Representatives and the Presidency. The
Pennsylvania Legislature created the districting plan at a pivotal moment
when Republican party leaders were fighting to maintain control at both the
national and the state level.278
The Pennsylvania House and Senate could not agree on a new districting
plan and the deadlock led to the appointment of a bipartisan conference
committee that eventually passed the plan into law.279  Though the
committee was "bipartisan," plaintiffs alleged that Republicans all but
locked Democrats out of the process.280
270. Eric J. Stockman, Constitutional Gerrymandering: Fonfara v. Reapportionment
Commission, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1227, 1230 (1993).
271. See Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 57.
272. See, e.g., supra notes 12, 13, 27.
273. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
274. Id. at 272.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Vieth v. Pennsylvania (Vieth 1), 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534-36 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
Though Pennsylvania is not always considered a hotbed of political activity, its status as a
vital swing state in anticipation of the 2004 presidential election illustrates the contentious
nature of the political landscape. Robert J. McCarthy, Unions on Election Footing: Kerry's
Supporters Pour into Swing States like Pennsylvania, Buffalo News, June 27, 2004, at Al.
278. See Brennan, supra note 40, at 274-75 (explaining the role of Karl Rove, Dennis
Hastert, Rick Santorum, and Thomas Davis in the courting of the Pennsylvania Legislature
in order to retain party control); see also Abramsky, supra note 13, at 15 (explaining that
although the Republican Party has denied administration involvement in the redistricting
power grab, in those states where redistricting has become an issue such as Texas and
Colorado, Republican representatives had been contacted by Karl Rove).
279. Vieth v. Pennsylvania (Vieth 11), 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (M.D. Pa 2002).
280. Although this commission included four Republican members and two Democratic
members, it seems that this bipartisanship was illusory. Compare Brief for the Appellants at
6-10, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (No. 02-1580), with Brief for the Appellees at
8-10, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (No. 02-1580) (refuting the claim of bipartisan
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Three Pennsylvania Democrats filed a complaint against Republican
members of the Pennsylvania Legislature, alleging that the districting plan
("Act I") violated the standards set forth in Bandemer, the one-person, one-
vote principle, the First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and § 1983 of the United States Code.28 1 The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss on all counts except the one-person, one-vote
claim (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that Act I constituted an unconstitutional
government classification based on political association, 282 and denying a
constitutional guarantee to successful participation in the political
process).283 A litany of cases followed, 284 and eventually the Pennsylvania
legislators created a revised districting plan ("Act 34") to remedy any
impermissible population deviations of the previous plan. 285
A district court reviewed Act 34 and found that it was a "good faith
effort" to remedy the one-vote violation and was valid based on
mathematical equality among district populations. 286 The court relied on
the rationale from Badham,287 and found that the "'[p]laintiffs did not
allege facts indicating that they have been shut out of the political process
and,.therefore, they [cannot establish the threshold requirement of] an actual
discriminatory effect'.. . as required by Davis v. Bandemer. '288 Having a
more difficult time electing their officials was not a constitutional injury,
and because plaintiffs failed to meet the effects prong, the Court affirmed
the districting plan. 289
Convinced that the Pennsylvania plan violated the U.S. Constitution, the
Pennsylvania Democrats appealed the court's decision directly to the
bias and stating that nearly half of the Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania House voted
in favor of Act I).
281. Vieth 1, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37.
282. Id. at 537-43.
283. Id. at 548 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)) (agreeing that the First
Amendment protects political association but that the plaintiffs failed to show how Act I
violated their First Amendment rights). Additional courts have applied this reasoning. See,
e.g., Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1992); Pope v. Blue,
809 F. Supp at 392, 398 (W.D. N.C. 1992); Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 675 (N.D. Ca.
1988) aff'd., 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). "Two Pennsylvania Democratic voters filed a [parallel
suit] in state court, claiming that the districting plan's partisan bias violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution .... The [Pennsylvania Supreme Court] found that the plan would produce a
14-to-5 or 13-to-6 Republican advantage in the State's congressional delegation, even if
Republican candidates received less than half the votes cast." Ultimately, however, "the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' state-law claims [as] ... deficient
because they had not shown that Democrats would be 'shut out of the political process."'
Brief for the Appellants, supra note 280, at 14.
284. For a full description of the proceedings in the lower court, see generally Brennan,
supra note 40, at 281-93.
285. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 273 (2004).
286. Vieth v. Pennsylvania (Vieth 111), 241 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482 (M.D. Pa. 2003)
(rejecting the renewed motion by the plaintiffs from Vieth I and Vieth II challenging the
constitutionality of Act 34).
287. Supra notes 263-68.
288. Vieth Ili, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (quoting Vieth 1, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 547).
289. Id. at 484-85.
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Supreme Court.290 The Democrats alleged that Act 34 included districts
that "slic[ed] through municipalities, counties, and communities and
creat[ed] bizarrely shaped districts, one which appeared like a "dragon
descending on Philadelphia from the west, splitting up towns and
communities." 291
The Democrats claimed that Pennsylvania Legislators violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution, 292 and
ignored traditional districting principles, creating districts with the sole
purpose of maximizing Republican control of Congress, "to thwart majority
rule." 293 Since partisan bias was the predominant intent behind the plan,
appellants claimed that the Court should invalidate the plan for giving
Republicans an artificial advantage in at least thirteen of the State's
nineteen districts. 294
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, affirmed the district court
decision and held that political gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable,
overruling Bandemer.295 Four justices held that all partisan gerrymandering
claims were non-justiciable because standards existed to measure them.296
Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, found that while the Court had to dismiss
the case at bar, he would not hold all partisan gerrymandering claims non-
justiciable.2 97 The dissenters failed to agree on a standard by which to
measure the unconstitutionality of a gerrymander. 298
The plurality held that neither the Equal Protection Clause, nor Article I,
Section 2, nor Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution "provide[d] a
290. Districting claims are decided by three-judge panels, see 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000),
and the panel decisions can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding
required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges." Id.
291. See Brief for the Appellants, supra note 280, at 2, 42.
292. Id. at 25-26.
293. Id. at 20.
294. Id. at 2 (stating that Republican legislators admitted that their goal was to "maximize
the number of Republicans elected to Congress throughout the decade, while eliminating as
many Democratic incumbents as possible").
295. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
296. Id. at 267.
297. Id. at 301 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Five Justices found partisan gerrymandering
claims would be justiciable in the future and five rejected all tests proposed in the decision.
Daniel H. Lowenstein & Richard L. Hasen, Editorial, The Party Line, 3 Election L.J. 595,
595 (2004).
298. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a standard that asks
"whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the lines
drawn, forsaking all neutral principles"); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting) (calling for a
standard that requires "a plaintiff to satisfy elements of a prima facie cause of action," and
then allowing the state to rebut the evidence and "offer an affirmative justification for the
districting choices"); id. at 364-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing indicia to identify the
"unjustified entrenching in power of a political party that the voters have rejected"); see also
Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 491-98 (2004) (discussing the
dissension among the Justices).
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judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the States
and Congress may take into account when districting." 299 The plurality
conceded that partisan gerrymandering was incompatible with democratic
principles but reaffirmed the Court's inability to define a remedy. 300
Writing for the plurality, Justice Antonin Scalia found that because
"judicial action must be governed by a standard" or "by rule," partisan
gerrymandering claims should not fall within the province of the Court.301
Since "no judicially discernable and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims have emerged," the plurality concluded that
gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable. 30 2 The plurality, however,
failed to address the reasons for the Court's failure to adopt plausible
alternatives to equal protection. 303
The plurality systematically outlined the existing equal protection
standard from Bandemer, and dismissed the Bandemer test as
unworkable. 3°4  Redistricting was a "political calculus" 305 and the
"expression of interest group politics [have] substantial political
consequences." 30 6 Additionally, because parties compete for congressional
seats on a districtwide basis, the plurality denied the appropriateness of a
statewide claim of discrimination. 30 7 In one-person, one-vote cases, the
claims involve the individual's ability to have a say in the election of
representatives in her district.308 Gerrymandering, in contrast, involved a
group claim to have representation in government according to the size of
its membership, and the analysis is neither limited to one district nor easily
calculable.309
The plurality then refuted the concurring and dissenting opinions of Vieth
and described each opinion as a failure to enunciate a clear standard to
measure partisan gerrymandering claims.310 These differing standards
supported the conclusion that the issue was non-justiciable. 31'
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed that no "neutral principles for
drawing electoral boundaries" existed to render the Pennsylvania claim
justiciable and affirmed the district court's holding.312 In contrast to the
299. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305.
300. Id. at 292.
301. Id. at 274-75 (explaining the role of partisan gerrymandering in the history of the
American political system).
302. Id. at 281.
303. See id. at 279-83.
304. Id. at 281-84.
305. Id. at 285.
306. Id. (citations omitted).
307. Id. at 288.
308. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964) (utilizing an inquiry
involving three factors: where a voter lives, how many voters live in that district, and how
many voters are in other districts).
309. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287-89.
310. Id. at 292-307.
311. Id. at 305-06.
312. Id. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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plurality, Justice Kennedy refused to close the door to future
gerrymandering claims, 313 hoping instead that a "limited and precise
rationale" could emerge to correct constitutional violations in some
cases.
3 14
Focusing on the potential harm that a lack of legislative restraint could
cause to democratic principles, Justice Kennedy believed that holding
partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable might "erode confidence in
the courts," and defy the caution needed when legislation burdens
constitutional rights. 315 The evolving state of computer technology, new
and sophisticated methods of gerrymandering, legal scholarship, or a First
Amendment analysis could lead to a standard that exposes the harms
involved in discriminatory districting. 316
Though Justice Kennedy agreed that an equal protection analysis
governed the case at bar, he proffered the First Amendment freedom of
association as an alternative measure for determining the constitutionality
of partisan gerrymandering. 317 A First Amendment analysis, according to
Justice Kennedy, might be a better fit for partisan gerrymandering cases
because it does not focus on the "permissibility of an enactment's
classifications." 318  The First Amendment inquiry focuses on whether
legislation negatively affects voters because of their political beliefs. 319 In
racial gerrymandering, the equal protection analysis is simple: Race is
almost always an impermissible class. 320 However, the equal protection
analysis is less straightforward when the classification is political
affiliation. 321 With a First Amendment analysis, once the government
313. Id. at 306.
314. Id. The plurality believed Justice Kennedy's pronouncement was "not legally
available" because the only choice was to declare non-justiciability or find that an alternative
relevant standard had not been met. Id. at 301.
315. Id. at 309-10.
316. Id. at 306-14. But see generally Hasen, supra note 3 (refuting each of these potential
criteria and arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion does not point us in a helpful direction,
and the Court should wait for a social consensus to emerge about the validity of
gerrymandering before adjudicating these claims).
317. Vieth, 541 at 314-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing, without much explanation,
four cases in support of his First Amendment standard: Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976);
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989), Anderson v. Celebrezee, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)). See
discussion infra Part II1.B for the relevance of these cases in a partisan gerrymandering
context.
318. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315. But see Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 58 (stating
that Justice Kennedy's opinion exemplifies the mistaken impulse to frame structural
problems in the framework of individual rights, and then to couch those problems in First
Amendment terms).
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makes any viewpoint-based classification, the state must show that the
district was drawn to further a compelling government purpose. 322
Ultimately, the inquiry would require an evaluation of the purpose and
effect of legislation, 323 but in a manner different from that under the Equal
Protection Clause. 324 If the government applied a permissible classification
(political affiliation) in a manner that burdened representational rights
because of "ideology, beliefs, or political association," the state would have
the burden of proffering a compelling state interest.325
The First Amendment is central to representative democracy326 because
it protects individuals against legislation that discriminates based on
political beliefs.327 To be invalid, politics as a classification must be
"applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate
legislative objective." 328
The plurality viewed Justice Kennedy's test as a deterrent to the use of
political processes to afford actual relief.329 While acknowledging the First
Amendment standard in a brief paragraph, Justice Scalia stated that "if [the
First Amendment claim] were sustained, [it] would render unlawful all
consideration of political affiliation in districting, just as the [First
Amendment] render[ed] unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in
hiring for non-policy-level government jobs."330
Thus, the plurality denied the applicability of First Amendment cases to
suggest that partisan gerrymanders were subject to strict scrutiny, finding
that "'[n]othing in our case-law compels the conclusion that racial and
political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional
scrutiny."' 331
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed that statewide partisan
discrimination claims were non-justiciable. 332 Justice Stevens would allow
courts to consider individual district gerrymandering claims as courts do in
the racial context, subjecting district claims to strict scrutiny. 333  The
plurality rejected this approach, denying similarities between race and
322. Id. at 315 (adding that "all this depends first on courts' having available a
manageable standard by which to measure the effect of the apportionment and so to conclude
that the State did impose a burden or restriction on the rights of a party's voters").
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. (suggesting this test was beneficial because it left discretion regarding policy
objectives and methods of implementation to each state).
326. Id. at 314.
327. Id. (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
328. Id. at 307.
329. Id. at 304-05 (concluding that the holding of non-justiciability was warranted in the
partisan gerrymandering, which was dissimilar to apportionment cases).
330. Id. at 294. This statement was actually made in reference to Justice Stevens' use of
First Amendment cases to fashion a justification for the use of equal protection in districting.
Id.
331. Id. at 293 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993)).
332. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333. See id. at 319-22.
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political affiliation, and emphasized that the Court has not used strict
scrutiny to review political gerrymandering. 334  Justice Stevens's
conclusion that "state action that discriminates against a political minority
for the sole and unadorned purpose of maximizing the power of the
majority plainly violates the decision maker's duty to remain impartial" 335
could not be reconciled with the realities of districting where political
success is a valid motive. 336
Justice David Souter agreed that courts could review partisan
gerrymandering claims only on the district level; he proposed a standard in
which plaintiffs would have to prove a five-factor prima facie test before
succeeding on a partisan districting claim.337 Once a plaintiff presented
these five factors, the burden would shift to the state to justify the lines by
"reference to objectives other than naked partisan advantage." 338 Justice
Scalia criticized Souter's test as too quantitative to provide guidance to
parties or lower courts. 339  Additionally, this test did not address the
fundamental question of when gerrymandering reached the level of a
constitutional violation, 340 but aimed to uncover only the existence of "an
'extremity of unfairness."' 341 For all the stated reasons, this case-by-case
analysis was unworkable. 342
Justice Breyer's dissent stated that "unjustified entrenchment" violated
the Constitution, 343  and focused on the democratic harms of
gerrymandering. 344 Justice Breyer's only clear requirement was that the
courts examine claims on a statewide level.345 The "unjust[] entrenchment"
test failed to articulate a clear measure of partisan discrimination and did
not provide a manageable standard to regulate gerrymandering. 346
The Supreme Court evaluated Vieth twice within nine months of writing
the decision. Prior to the decision to remand in Jackson v. Perry,347 the
Court affirmed a district court decision in Georgia that purely partisan
purposes did not qualify as a legitimate state interest to justify deviation
from population equality in districting. 348 While striking down the state
334. Id. at 323-26.
335. Id. at 326.
336. Id. at 292-94.
337. Id. at 346-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (adopting a set of factors from a combination of
Title VII and voting rights case law).
338. Id. at 351.
339. Id. at 296-97.
340. Id.
341. ld. at 295 (quoting Justice Souter's dissent).
342. Id. at 306.
343. Id. at 360.
344. Id. at 356-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
345. Id. a 362-63.
346. See id. at 299 (criticizing Justice Breyer's approach).
347. Jackson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004) (mem.), vacating Session v. Perry, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex.).
348. See Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 76-77 (explaining that by summarily
affirming the lower court's decision, Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004) (mem.), did not
specify which of the lower court's alternative holdings it relied on).
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districting plan for the Georgia House and Senate on one-person, one-vote
grounds, the decision stated that "had the Court in Vieth adopted a
standard... the standard would likely have been satisfied in this case." 349
Lower courts are left with little guidance on how to proceed when faced
with political gerrymandering claims in the future. While Justice Scalia
summarily rejected the use of the First Amendment or strict scrutiny in
partisan gerrymandering claims,350 a more in-depth analysis is needed to
explore the role of the court in the future and the potential manageability of
a freedom of association standard.
II. THE PROPER JUDICIAL ROLE
The fact that the Supreme Court addressed partisan gerrymandering
claims on three different occasions in 2004 shows that the issue is both
timely and complex. The increasing vehemence with which political parties
create partisan districting plans is not limited to Texas.351  In 2001,
California House Democrats paid $20,000 apiece to a redistricting
consultant for "designer districts." 352 In the 2001 national elections, only
four challengers defeated House incumbents, the fewest challenger
successes in history. 353 For the third consecutive election less than one in
ten House races involved a competitive margin. 354 Both Cox v. Larios355
and Jackson v. Perry356 demonstrate that there is much need for guidance in
lower courts and legislative chambers. In order to proceed in this area, the
Court must clarify the scope of its presence in the partisan gerrymandering
context.
The Justices fundamentally disagree on two main issues: whether the
judicial branch is the proper watchdog for this legislative task of districting,
and whether the Constitution provides a standard that courts can use to
measure the effects of a partisan gerrymander. 357 A resolution of these
349. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2808.
350. See supra note 331.
351. John B. Anderson & Robert Richie, A Better Way to Vote: Partisan Gerrymanders,
Winner-Take-All Elections, and Decisions like Vieth v. Jubelirer Degrade Our Democracy,
Legal Times, May 17, 2004, at 68 (proposing that the action in Texas resulted from
Republican success in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Florida). The Colorado
Legislature also partook in mid-decade districting in 2000-2001. Cox, supra note 12, at 751-
52.
352. Republicans agreed to this plan, in exchange for their own safe seats, and the plan
worked: Fifty incumbents won by a landslide, and no challenger secured even forty percent
of the vote. See Anderson & Richie, supra note 351, at 68.
353. Id.
354. Id. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 44 (proposing that courts define the harm
of gerrymandering in terms of competition and take the districting process out of the hands
of legislators with a vested interest in the process). But see Persily, supra note 44, at 650
(refuting that declining competition is a result of partisan districting practices because
statewide elections are unaffected by gerrymandering).
355. 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).
356. 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004) (mem.), vacating Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458
(E.D. Tex.).
357. See supra notes 295-346.
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issues will dictate the success or failure of future partisan gerrymandering
claims. Part II.A discusses the threshold issue of justiciability, clarifying
the arguments for and against the role of the judiciary as an arbiter of
districting grievances. Part 11.B presents case law support for the freedom
of association standard in partisan gerrymandering.
A. Is the Court the Proper Arbiter of Partisan Gerrymandering?
Critics of judicial involvement claim that partisan gerrymandering falls
squarely within the political question doctrine and that the issue is non-
justiciable. 358  This section will address the main academic and legal
arguments against justiciability and present responses to those arguments in
turn.
1. Districting Is Left to Other Branches of Government
Opponents of judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering argue that
the task of redistricting is inherently political 359 and "textually committed to
a coordinate political branch. '360  The constitutional commitment of
election regulation to other branches in Article I, Section 5,361 Article I,
Section 4,362 and the Tenth Amendment363 precludes judicial regulation of
the districting process. 364
Proponents of judicial intervention respond by highlighting several
aspects of judicial precedent which refute this argument. The Supreme
Court has found that the constitutional power of legislators to enact election
regulations is limited to procedural regulations, not those that are outcome-
determinative. 365  Judicial involvement in racial gerrymandering and
apportionment demonstrates that there is room for judicial involvement in
regulation of these legislative tasks.366 Additionally, Congress provided
special mechanisms to allow judicial involvement in districting through
358. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
But see Lewyn, supra note 32, at 428-29 (finding that "adjudication of partisan
gerrymandering cases affects none of the political question factors cited in Baker, and that
political gerrymandering cases should be justiciable").
359. See Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S.
109 (1986); see also Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 4 (positing that there are no
coherent public interest criteria for legislative districting, "which constitute[s] the very stuff
of politics").
360. Allan B. Moore, Note, A "Frightful Political Dragon" Indeed: Why Constitutional
Challenges Cannot Subdue the Gerrymander, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 949, 1014 (1990).
361. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 5 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members").
362. Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution grants states the same power to judge
elections of its members.
363. The Tenth Amendment provides that powers not delegated to the Federal
Government are left to the states.
364. See Lewyn, supra note 32, at 428.
365. See generally Schwartz, supra note 100.
366. See Lewyn, supra note 32, at 438.
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special three-judge panels, and allowing court drawn districting. 367 Finally,
the political branches never had exclusive control over gerrymandering.
2. No Judicially Manageable Standard Exists
The second argument against justiciability is the lack of a "judicially
discoverable and manageable standard" for resolving partisan
gerrymandering claims.368  Critics of the judiciary as an arbiter of
gerrymandering claims believe that not only is it difficult to agree on the
harms caused by gerrymandering, but there is no precise way to measure
the harms that do occur. Unlike vote dilution claims, where there is a
simple arithmetic formula, infringement on political success is difficult to
define.369 Many of these critics agree that while partisan gerrymandering
may have negative impacts on the political process, it is extremely difficult
to measure such impacts.370
The countervailing argument is that the political question doctrine,
however, does not require courts to provide an arithmetically precise
solution.371 Growth of standards can take time,372 and the impossibility of
perfection should not "paralyze attempts to identify and ameliorate the most
egregious gerrymanders, the clearest obstacle to a meaningful concept of
representative equality." 373
Opponents of intervention claim that the "no manageable standards"
argument is a "smokescreen" because the Court has demonstrated an ability
to measure violations of mathematical complexity in Title VII employment
cases. 374 Courts have also proven able to measure partisan strength.375
367. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
368. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)); accord Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 156 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[v]ote dilution analysis is far less manageable when extended to
major political parties than if confined to racial minority groups," because the courts will
have to adjudicate competing claims of several groups and "the difficulty of measuring
voting strength is heightened in the case of a major political party"). See generally
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45.
369. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
370. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 45, at 33.
371. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (declaring that apportionment "is far too subtle and complicated a
business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic");
see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 731, 745 (1998).
372. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
373. See Gordon Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in Political
Gerrymandering and the Courts, supra note 26, at 24.
374. See Criteria, supra note 57, at 154; see also Silverberg, supra note 49, at 940
(explaining that though not neutral in a pure sense, some district lines will be more "fair"
than those chosen purely out of partisan self-interest).
375. Lewyn, supra note 32, at 438 (citing Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp.




Additionally, mathematical formulas are not necessarily required to
measure the harms associated with gerrymandering. 376 The argument
against manageable standards places too much focus on the effects of
gerrymanders, and not enough on the intent of the legislators. 377  A
quantitative analysis, in this view, should be replaced with some less formal
measure that focuses on the intent of the legislators in the process as a
whole, rather than partisan outcomes per election.378
Critics still argue that even if courts discovered a standard, it should not
be judicially implemented because every line drawn will have political
consequences, whether intended or not.379 Districts, even when created by
a "neutral body" such as the courts, have political consequences that would
embroil the judiciary in politics and create "grave political and
constitutional risks." 380
The fact that not all measurements of districting may be completely
neutral does not prohibit the courts from addressing claims where
constitutional harms exist.381 Commentators rebut that the Court can limit
its involvement to ensure constitutional protection, promoting self-
enforcement by legislatures, and still allow legislative discretion in
constructing the structure of districting plans. 382
3. Courts Should Not Make Policy Determinations
The third argument in favor of non-justiciability is that courts, by
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, will be making policy
determinations that should be left to legislators. 383 Any attempt at judicial
line drawing involves decisions regarding appropriate levels of
representation that require policy decisions regarding proportional
376. See, e.g., Criteria, supra note 57, at 117-18, 121 (arguing that statistical methods
will fail the courts and proposing twelve indicia that courts should use to identify).
377. See Karlan, supra note 371, at 745 (criticizing objective standards because they fail
to address the allocation of power).
378. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 162-69 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
379. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 632; see also Lewyn, supra note 32, at 426; Lowenstein
& Steinberg, supra note 45, at 9.
380. Schuck, supra note 32, at 1330.
381. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 105, at 236.
382. See Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 66-68 (discussing how the standard set in
the racial gerrymandering cases led to a self-limiting principle for legislatures, and how this
could also happen in the partisan districting context); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note
74, at 534-35 (arguing that the judiciary should play a minimal role in partisan
gerrymandering); cf Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 699 (1998) (arguing that for
judicial involvement to correct anticompetitive partisan gerrymandering plans, a court
should play an active role upholding only a limited type of districting plans).
383. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 154-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Schuck, supra note
32, at 1326 ("Persistent warnings about the Court's limited ability to reform politics and
about the dangers that lay ahead have gone unheeded.").
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representation 384 and preferences for nonpartisan gerrymanders over
bipartisan districting plans. 385  The people of each state and their
representatives should make decisions about democratic structures, not the
judiciary. 386 Courts are equipped only to rectify exclusion, not to determine
the validity of structures that constrain electoral behavior. 387
In fact, these critics argue that judicial regulation of gerrymandering may
actually harm the electorate because partisan line drawing ensures stability,
serving both a legitimacy function and an accountability function. 388 The
creation of safe seats and incumbent protections allows voters to elect
incumbents who have experience and an ability to lead.389 Taking partisan
factors into account ensures that the system functions smoothly, while a
more "politically mindless approach [could produce] the most grossly
gerrymandered results." 390
The counterargument is that these critics do not account for judicial
power to intervene and adjust legislative district lines when legislators fail
to act. 391 Additionally, judicial oversight of the process does not require
courts to dictate the makeup of individual districts or force proportional
representation 392 because state legislatures and Congress still have
discretion over plans, as long as the plans do not violate the Constitution.393
The democratic harms created by gerrymanders-undermining the
integrity of the democratic process, shutting out minority viewpoints,
diluting the voting power of statewide majority groups, protecting
ineffective incumbents, and creating voter apathy 394-warrant judicial
intervention. 395 Without judicial intervention, politicians could set their
384. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Evan
Geldzahler, Davis v. Bandemer: Remedial Difficulties in Political Gerrymandering, 37
Emory L.J. 443, 445 (1998); Schuck, supra note 32, at 1335; Shapiro, supra note 105, at
254.
385. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 154 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lewyn, supra note 32, at
427. See supra note 44 for a discussion of bipartisan and partisan gerrymandering.
386. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 104, at 645. But see, e.g., Silverberg, supra note 49, at
913, 940 (while "lines will never be neutral in the pure sense," leaving the process to the
incumbents "ensures that there will be district manipulation").
387. Gardner, supra note 104, at 645.
388. See generally Schuck, supra note 32 (arguing that competition and structural fairness
fail to justify judicial intervention in partisan gerrymandering).
389. See Persily, supra note 44, at 670-71.
390. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
391. See supra note 14.
392. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 184-85 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); see Cox, supra note 12, at 767 (by "[d]efining partisan fairness as the absence of
partisan bias ... it [is] possible to identify unfair partisan advantage in a districting plan
without committing to proportional representation").
393. See, e.g., Fuentes-Rowher, supra note 74, at 580, 592-93 (advocating for guarded
judicial intervention).
394. Brennan, supra note 40, at 247.
395. See Shapiro, supra note 105, at 243 ("Once the electoral mechanism is fatally loaded
in favor of some criteria and not others, the self-correcting capacities of politics fail and
judicial intervention is necessary to save democracy."); see also Michelle H. Browdy,
Computer Models and Post-Bandemer Redistricting, 99 Yale L.J. 1379, 1383 (1990)
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own rules for determining future election outcomes, 396 which is contrary to
the idea that the will of the people grants legitimacy to the government. 397
Proponents of judicial intervention believe that partisan gerrymandering
is a self-perpetuating breakdown of the political process, and intervention is
warranted because elected representatives have a "vested interest[] in
maintaining the political status quo." 398  The political question doctrine
should not control in the arena of election law, which is already highly
regulated by the courts. 399 Gerrymanders severely inhibit the role of voters
in democratic institutions and subvert conceptions of the balance of power
understood by the framers, and courts must step in to protect the process. 400
Because the beneficiaries (and possibly the architects) of partisan
gerrymandering are in Congress,401 it is appropriate for courts to adjudicate
and ensure that democratic processes are functioning correctly.
Future adjudication of partisan gerrymandering relies on more than a
declaration that the issue is justiciable. Successful litigation requires that
plaintiffs articulate a measurable constitutional standard.40 2  To date,
plaintiffs have failed to articulate either an associational standard, or an
equal protection claim sufficient to garner the majority support needed for
the invalidation of a gerrymander. 40 3 However, as demonstrated by the
reapportionment line of cases, manageable standards can develop over time
if the necessary constitutional foundation exists.404  Moving forward,
plaintiffs face a choice of continuing to rely on an equal protection
standard, or developing a manageable alternative. The remainder of this
part will present support for the use of a First Amendment standard in
partisan gerrymandering.
("[E]liminating judicial intervention seems particularly risky in a system in which legislators
can approve redistricting plans in the face of overwhelming voter disapproval.").
396. Nathaniel Persily, The Search for Comprehensive Descriptions and Prescriptions in
Election Law, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1509, 1516 (2003).
397. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (recognizing
the importance of sustaining democracy and freedom and urging "that government of the
people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth").
398. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 382, at 709.
399. See Lewyn, supra note 32, at 427-28.
400. See Federalism Injury, supra note 70, at 1198; see also Lewyn, supra note 32, at 437
("This argument is entitled to less weight where legislators have elected themselves through
gerrymandering, just as it would be entitled to no weight if the legislators had elected
themselves by stuffing ballot boxes."). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004)
("It is significant that the Framers provided a remedy for such practices in the Constitution.
Article 1, § 4, while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal
elections, permitted Congress to 'make or alter' those districts if it wished.").
401. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 134, at 207-08 (discussing the role of legislative intent in
creating districting plans).
402. See Bandemer's Gap, supra note 199, at 66-67.
403. See supra Part I.B.2.
404. See supra Part I.B.l.
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B. Case Law Support for a Freedom of Association Standard
In Vieth, Justice Kennedy referenced four cases in support of a First
Amendment standard.405 Additional cases also support the power of the
courts to step in and strike down legislation that limits voting rights based
on voters' political viewpoints. 406 Using precedent from a broader area of
voting rights case law, this section demonstrates that the Court has applied
strict scrutiny to protect individual First Amendment rights and the integrity
of the democratic process.
Part lI.B.1 will show that courts have struck down state voting
requirement laws out of concern for political viewpoint discrimination,
even when using the language of the Equal Protection Clause. Part II.B.2
will discuss the four cases presented in Vieth in support of a manageable
freedom of association standard in partisan gerrymandering cases.
These cases implicate the rights involved in partisan gerrymandering
claims and provide direction to courts reviewing partisan gerrymandering
claims.
1. Vote Distribution Cases
First Amendment issues are particularly evident in a series of cases
regarding state distribution of the voting franchise. 407 Interestingly, courts
have decided these cases on equal protection grounds,40 8 even though the
cases discuss viewpoint discrimination in dicta.40 9  The Court, while
allowing states discretion in adopting voter qualifications, has scrutinized
state regulations and struck down laws that do not serve a legitimate state
interest. 410 Courts have limited the power of state legislators to guarantee
that states do not "exclud[e] persons from an election because of their
political opinions."4 11
These cases explicitly express concern for ensuring that the state does not
disadvantage citizens with disfavored political views. 4 12  Even
qualifications that might be legitimate to ensure voters were knowledgeable
405. See supra note 317.
406. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 59-60 (1970)
(discussing assimilating the right to vote with First Amendment rights in order to avoid
subjective judgments in voting rights cases); Charles L. Black, Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law 9 (1969) (once franchise is extended to people, the state should not be
permitted to differentiate voters based on opinion); see also Calhoun, supra note 86
(analyzing historic voting rights cases in support of a First Amendment analysis for
distributional voting rights controversies).
407. States have a right to predicate voting qualifications on intelligent use of the ballot
and qualifications need only be rationally related to the prescribed qualification. See
Calhoun, supra note 86, at 559 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666,
668 (1966)).
408. Id. at 563-66.
409. Id. at 566-67 (discussing the use of First Amendment rhetoric in these voting cases).
410. Id. at 558-63.
411. Id. at 562 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)).
412. Id. (discussing Carrington, 380 U.S. at 94).
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(a permissible goal) could be invalidated if used as a proxy to require that
voters held acceptable viewpoints as a prerequisite to voting. 413 Judicial
scrutiny of viewpoint-based regulations highlights the role that First
Amendment protections play in the politicized arena of election regulations
and demonstrates that the Court need not defer to state voting laws in all
cases.
4 14
2. Political Parties and Freedom of Association
The First Amendment, while not central to individual voting rights
jurisprudence generally, plays a key role in the regulation of election law
and political parties and is instructive in districting litigation. This section
will discuss the freedom to associate in the four areas of election law cited
by Justice Kennedy in his Vieth concurrence: internal party affairs, primary
regulations, third-party ballots access, and patronage cases. 415
The right to associate in order to pursue political goals is necessary to
ensure true democracy. 416 Political parties serve a very particular function
in a democratic system by allowing members to "gain a voice" in politics,
fostering competitiveness and participation in self-government. 417 State
regulation of political parties therefore implicates the fundamental rights of
participation and voting, and warrants judicial scrutiny.418 State legislation
413. Id. at 562.
414. The Court has attached a high value to equal participation in the political process,
and the commonalities between equal protection and First Amendment concerns have been
the focus of scholarship which analyzes Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), through the lens
of a First Amendment-equal protection doctrine. While specific restraints on speech are
outside the purview of this note, these scholars recognize the existence of a "common
constitutional value underlying rights of speech and rights of political participation." See
Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and
Participation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2409, 2498 (2003) [hereinafter First Amendment Equal
Protection]. These scholars focus specifically on the limits that the Supreme Court has
placed on the use of official discretion to restrict speech per se. See also Abner Greene, Is
There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore? 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1643 (2005);
Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality after Bush v. Gore: A First Amendment Approach to
Voting Rights, in Final Arbiter: The Consequences of Bush v. Gore for Law and Politics
(Christopher P. Banks et al. eds. forthcoming 2005). Daniel Tokaji has noted that "First
Amendment Equal Protection cases" could present a justification for entry into the "political
thicket" of districting. See First Amendment Equal Protection, supra at 2516-17.
415. See supra note 317:
416. See Charles, supra note 86, at 1239-40 (discussing the fundamental nature of
association rights and democracy, which supports the use of association in an electoral
context). "[R]ight of association is almost as inalienable as the right of personal liberty" and
"freedom of association is necessary to secure the full and informed and effective application
of citizens' power of deliberative reasoning ... an indispensable prerequisite of democratic
societies." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
417. Id. at 1249 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973)).
418. See Robert C. Wigton, American Political Parties Under the First Amendment, 7
J.L. & Pol'y 411, 413-15 (1999). Though the Court has expanded First Amendment
freedoms to apply to political parties, it has not always done so in a "logical" manner,
providing little guidance. See id. at 420 n.24 for a discussion of the Court's efforts in
applying the freedom of association. This right to associate applies to a "party in the
electorate" (individual party members), a "party in government" (legislators), and a "party
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also affects major parties by manipulating the "competitiveness of the
electoral terrain." 419
In the heavily political area of election primaries, the Court has protected
the rights of political party members to associate with whom they choose
from regulation by the state. The following cases deal with the rights of
political parties and their members, and demonstrate the power of the right
to assemble and associate for the purposes of electoral success and the
ability of courts to limit government infringement on the right to
associate.420
The Court heavily restricts the ability of states to dictate internal party
affairs. 421  States are limited in their ability to regulate internal affairs
because such regulations impede a party's ability to ensure orderly and fair
elections. 422 The power of parties to contribute to the elections process
outweighs the state interest in regulating party affairs. 423 In Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Comittee., the Court struck down a
California law banning endorsements and restrictions on political parties
under a balancing test weighing the state's narrowly tailored compelling
interests against the associational rights of party members. 424 The Court
interpreted the right to association broadly, focusing on the importance of
banding together in order to select representatives. 425 The "State's broad
power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections 'does not
extinguish the State's responsibility to observe the limits established by the
First Amendment.' ' 426
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, both major and minor political
parties challenged the California system of blanket primaries, which were
adopted via statewide initiative.427 Both political parties argued that the
system violated their associational freedom by forcing them to allow non-
party members to select their nominees and inhibiting their ability to
maintain distinct identities.428 Using strict scrutiny, the Court found the
organization" (leadership and internal affairs the 1960s). Id. at 416 (laying out the context
where political party members have gained freedoms under the First Amendment).
419. Id. at 440 (arguing that the burden falls most heavily on third parties and that these
parties should receive greater protection from the state).
420. See V.0. Key Jr., Politics, Parties, & Pressure Groups 163-65 (1958).
421. See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (striking
down a California statute regulating the organization and composition of internal party
bodies in the Democratic Party).
422. See id. at 223.
423. See Wigton, supra note 418.
424. Eu, 489 U.S. at 222-33.
425. Id. at 224 ("Freedom of association means.., the right to identify the people who
constitute the association, and to select a standard bearer who best represents the party's
ideologies and preferences.") (internal quotations omitted).
426. Id. at 222 (internal citation omitted). The Court recognized the State's legitimate
interest in ensuring fair and honest elections, but rejected the goal of stable government and
party stability as too broad to justify the regulations. Id. at 231-32.
427. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570-71 (2000).
428. Id. at 582-86.
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State's justifications were legitimate but not compelling. 429 The autonomy
of the party as a private entity, and the right to associate trumped the State's
interests in better representation, expansion of debate, fairness, greater voter
choice, and increases in participation. 430 The Jones court prohibited the
state from interfering with the right of party members to associate by
limiting their membership. 431
In the third case cited by Justice Kennedy, Anderson v. Celebrezze, the
Court struck down Ohio's early filing deadline,432 which required
independent candidates who wanted to be on the ballot to declare their
candidacies earlier than others. 433  The plaintiffs claimed the statute
violated their right of association and equal protection.434 The opinion
focused on the harm done to voters, rather than the injury to the rights of
the candidate.435 "[E]xclusion of candidates also burdens voters' freedom
of association, because an election campaign is an effective platform for the
expression of views, on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a
rallying point for like-minded citizens." 436
The Court addressed electoral structures broadly, finding that "complex
election codes" that regulate every step of the process always impact the
right to vote and the right to associate.437 The Court's analysis presented an
expansive view of the reach of the right to associate. The Court directly
addressed how electoral structure can burden the individual right to
associate, and couched the decision in both the equal protection doctrine
and the First Amendment, a marked departure from the typical equal
429. Id. at 584-86.
430. Id. at 582-86. The State's interest in enhancing the democratic nature of the election
process and the representative capacity of officials did not justify burdening the rights of
political association. The Court demonstrated its "solicitude for political association" by
finding that state electoral laws or structures that burden associational rights are
unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored and serve a compelling state interest. See
Charles, supra note 86, at 1270-71.
431. Teresa MacDonald, California Democratic Party v. Jones: Invalidation of the
Partisan Gerrymander, 29 Pepp. L. Rev. 319, 328 (2002) ("Relying on prior decisions, the
Court reiterated that political parties have a constitutional right under the First Amendment
to freely associate and to limit their association to people with common goals and ideals.").
The Court noted that "[i]n no area is the political association's right to exclude more
important than in the process of selecting its nominee." Jones, 530 U.S at 575.
432. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). When the Court first entered ballot
access claims, it applied a type of heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 31-32 (1968) ("The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals
means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity
to win votes.... Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.").
433. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782-83.
434. Charles, supra note 86, at 1250-51 (discussing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780).
435. See id. at 1250-51.
436. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787-88.
437. Charles, supra note 86, at 1251-52 (admitting that a strict reading could simply mean
that freedom to associate is met as long as groups can find a candidate to rally around and
discuss issues, but refuting this reading based on an analysis of Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788
n.8) (citations omitted).
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protection standard. 438 The Court focused on a party's ability to acquire
political power,439 finding that the "asserted interest in political stability
amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition...
generated by independent candidates who were previously affiliated with
the party, an interest that conflicted with First Amendment values. 440
The fourth case cited by Justice Kennedy, Elrod v. Burns,4 4 1 deals with
party patronage (the use of political favors by an incumbent party). Elrod
held that the historically rooted practice violated the First Amendment
freedom of association of a county official who was fired when the
opposing party came into office.442 Absent compelling justification, the
government cannot base employment decisions on the partisan affiliation of
those seeking to work for government. 443
These cases demonstrate the fundamental nature of associational rights
involved in political association, and the ability of the court to balance
individual rights against state electoral regulations. 444 The adoption of
these precedents in the partisan gerrymandering context requires judicial
will, and an understanding of how such balancing would operate in future
gerrymandering cases.
III. WHAT'S NEXT: HOW TO ADJUDICATE PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
CLAIMS IN THE FUTURE
Recent Supreme Court decisions and the increasing presence of
sophisticated gerrymandering tactics confirm that the judiciary should
remain involved in the adjudication of partisan gerrymandering cases.
Partisan gerrymandering precedents have left lower courts seeking a
"faceless injury," 445 and it is time for courts to step in and protect
democracy. A redefinition of the harms caused by partisan gerrymandering
is necessary for judicial relief in future cases. The road ahead, however, is
anything but clear.
Part 1I.A discusses the limitations of using the Equal Protection Clause
to measure the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims. Part
438. See id. at 1251.
439. Id. at 1253 n.246 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792-93) (citations omitted).
440. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 801-07. This case is credited with creating a balancing test
that applies strict scrutiny to government action if an employee's associational rights are
severely burdened. If rights are not severely burdened, the magnitude of the burden on the
minor party is balanced against the state interest. See Wigton, supra note 418, at 441.
441. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
442. Id. This practice has been restricted further under subsequent cases. See Wigton,
supra note 418, at 442 n.134 (discussing cases which expanded the First Amendment
protection to public employees). First Amendment freedom of association may not protect
employees with "policymaking duties" because party membership may be a pertinent
employment consideration. Id. at 448-49. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion rejected the
applicability of the First Amendment balancing test to partisan gerrymandering cases. See
supra note 330 and accompanying text.
443. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363.
444. See supra note 316 for criticism of this analysis.
445. Brennan, supra note 40, at 325.
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III.B posits the strengths and weaknesses of using the First Amendment
freedom of association as a measure for the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering claims. Finally, Part ILI.C proposes a framework for how
courts can implement the freedom of association standard.
A. Equal Protection: The Constitutional Standard of the Past
The equal protection doctrine repeatedly fails to provide relief to
plaintiffs, even where gerrymanders are admittedly the fruits of a politically
discriminatory districting plan.446 Thus, while plaintiffs have no difficulty
meeting the requirements of the intent prong of the Bandemer test, the
elusive effects prong has limited plaintiffs' success. 447
The goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect minorities
(particularly racial minorities) from discrimination by majority groups.448
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not create the doctrine to
provide group rights for a majority group; instead, equal protection should
protect individual members of minority groups from discrimination. 449
Partisan gerrymandering claims, as articulated in Bandemer, involve claims
by members of the Democratic and Republican parties, who do not
constitute a nationwide minority. By invoking the equal protection
doctrine, plaintiffs "twist[] [equal protection] out of its intended meaning
and use[] [it] to serve a purpose for which it was not designed. 45 °
Additionally, because the Supreme Court lacks a coherent definition of
fair representation on which to measure the harm to one political group in
an election, the effects prong has proved untenable. 451 The baseline group
of voters in a political group is elusive because political affiliation, unlike
race, shifts over time, and per election issue.452 The success of the equal
protection doctrine in racial gerrymandering cases, therefore, has not
carried over to the partisan arena.
The reapportionment cases that served as a precursor to partisan
gerrymandering claims involved a distinct constitutional injury, an injury
446. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 140 (1986) ("[The facts] support a finding
that an intention to discriminate was present.., but they do not show any actual
disadvantage beyond that shown by the election results ...."); see also Federalism Injury,
supra note 70, at 1196 (proposing that discriminatory intent is rarely hidden and that
Democrats also partake in dirty politics, quoting one Democratic districter to a member of
the opposition party: "We are going to shove [this map] up your f------.ass and you are
going to like it and I'll f--- any Republican I can.") (citation omitted).
447. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 151-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
449. See James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104
Colum. L. Rev. 837, 963 (2004) (stating that "the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
at least attempt to bar ... the entire infinitude of ... expedients through which majorities
oppress minorities") (internal quotation omitted).
450. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 103, 117 (2000).
451. See Rush, supra note 42, at 13-14.
452. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004).
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which is not easily reconciled with partisan gerrymandering. 453  The
reapportionment revolution involved a first order harm of the quantitative
value of the individual vote. In gerrymandering claims, the harm is that
districts split the electorate so the aggregation of votes for success is
limited. Plaintiffs have the ability to cast a vote, and that vote counts, so it
is the power of the individual vote that is at issue. The "attempt[s] to filter.
. .questions of democratic politics solely through the two words equal
protection [are] limiting, limitless, and ultimately unproductive." 454
B. The Freedom to Associate: The Constitutional Standard for the Future
This section proposes the use of an associational standard in partisan
gerrymandering-a standard which may assist in granting voters the right to
"full and effective participation. '455
While the Vieth plurality summarily rejected the use of the First
Amendment strict scrutiny analysis in partisan gerrymandering claims,456 a
more in-depth analysis provides support for this standard.
The freedom of association standard has proven to be judicially
manageable in the political arena. The role of freedom of association in the
adjudication of electoral regulation demonstrates that the Court can both
create manageable standards to balance the associational right against state
interests and strike down state regulations that "severely burden"
associational rights.457
Political association is an individual right, which protects "'not merely
the individual speaker but also organized activities, ranging from political
parties and media organizations to protest committees and dissident
groups."' 458 The use of an associational analysis, however, recognizes the
importance of groups in the political process and is more appropriate to
protecting political party members than the equal protection doctrine.
A freedom of association standard also emphasizes the qualitative and
instrumental value of the vote, avoiding the strict quantitative view of
voting rights that emerged in the reapportionment cases. 459 While evidence
453. Baker, supra note 373, at 24 (stating that the focus on geographical representation
has led to the "[ulnfinished reapportionment revolution," a "reinvigorated dimension of
maldistricting [that] can dilute the effective voting power of some individuals and magnify
the real power of others, depending on their geographic location").
454. Charles, supra note 86, at 1214 (internal quotation omitted).
455. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. A First Amendment analysis has been
proposed to protect against the harms of racial gerrymandering. Charles, supra note 86, at
1271.
456. See supra note 330.
457. Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 121 n.391.
458. Charles, supra note 86, at 1241 (quoting Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment
225 (1998)).




of discriminatory impacts plays a part in the analysis of a partisan
gerrymander, impacts should not be the focus of a judicial inquiry.460
Reviewing legislative districting under an associational rights standard
shifts the judicial focus from the disparate impacts461 of a districting plan to
the legislative intent in forming that plan.462 The political association
standard does not require courts to recognize political groups as a suspect
class in order to implement strict scrutiny, instead, the emphasis is on the
burden placed on associational rights.463  The focus is not on the
government classification itself, but on the goal of government
classifications.464 The freedom of association doctrine recognizes that the
First Amendment protects promotion of particular viewpoints, and that this
protection can apply to democratic structures. 465
Political bias is the hallmark of a partisan gerrymander, but courts have
failed to adopt the associational standard for several reasons. The freedom
of association standard is not without its limitations. Courts have denied
that the First Amendment guarantees electoral success and have reserved
use of the right to association for cases where a state denied individuals
access to the election system.4 66
Finally, some argue that the freedom of association standard does not
define adequate group representation and such a standard would require
courts to make fact-intensive inquiries into legislative intent.467
The associational analysis is nonetheless well suited to partisan
gerrymandering cases. "Competition in ideas and governmental policies is
at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms," 468 and the freedom of association standard recognizes the role
of political parties as the "most important mechanism for incorporating
citizen's preferences" in policy making 469 and promotes "vigorous, broadly
participatory electoral discourse." 470
460. Calhoun, supra note 86, at 598-602.
461. Supra Part I.B.2.
462. Calhoun, supra note 86, at 598-602.
463. This emphasis would dispel some of the fears expressed in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 288 (2004), where the plurality asked, "To begin with, how is a party's majority
status to be established?" Id. Justices expressed concerns were in prior gerrymandering
cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 156-61 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
464. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
465. Charles, supra note 86, at 1255.
466. See supra Part II.B.2.
467. Hasen, supra note 3, at 634-37; Constitutionalization, supra note 30, at 58-59.
468. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
469. Criteria, supra note 57, at 112-13.
470. See Magarian, supra note 96, at 1944.
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C. The Court's Role: Policing the Outer Boundaries of Partisan
Legitimacy
While the courts may not be able to command perfection in districting,
they can play a role in regulating the use of partisan-biased legislation.
Using the First Amendment, the court can heed the warning of critics who
argue against judicial involvement in the regulation of democratic
structures4 7 1 while at the same time safeguarding constitutional rights.
To bring an associational claim, a plaintiff must prove that the state
severely burdened her associational rights by creating a districting plan with
the sole intent of disadvantaging her political party at the polls.
Additionally, a plaintiff cannot challenge the plan on a statewide basis.
Instead, a plaintiff must prove that legislators created her particular district
with discriminatory intent. This requirement answers much of the debate
within the Bandemer decision related to whether individuals could bring
statewide discrimination claims472 by recognizing that representation is on a
district-by-district basis, and that elections are districtwide, not statewide.
A districting plan can only infringe on an individual's associational right if
the plan affects a specific election for which the voters banded together with
other party members to express their belief at the polls.
The associational standard for measuring partisan gerrymandering places
a high burden on plaintiffs and will avoid the litany of suits feared by some
critics of adjudication of these cases.4 73
Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that partisan discrimination
was the only goal of the legislator, relying on computer-generated
programs, legislative records, or the use of cracking, packing, or shacking
techniques, 4 74 the burden would shift to legislators to prove that partisan
bias was not the only motivation behind their plan.
If legislators proffer a compelling state interest, then the court can allow
the plan to stand. The court must balance the state's declared interest
against the burden on individual rights. The state's compelling interest
could be comprised of a number of traditional districting principles
articulated in Part I: contiguity, compactness, preservation of community
of interests, preservation of competitive districts, equal treatment of
incumbents, and creation of symmetry between political parties. 47 5
While the court could not accept population equality alone as a
compelling state interest, it could accept other formal and intent-based
criteria.47 6  Population equality is the one standard that is easily
manipulated at the touch of a computer button, and there are many ways to
construct a districting plan that meets this requirement. Additionally,
471. See supra Part II.A.
472. See supra Part I.B.3.
473. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
474. See discussion supra Part I.
475. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
476. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
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legislators used population equality expressly to defend partisan
inequality,477 and it is the population equality requirement that legislators
historically used to justify district plans that included severe partisan
gerrymanders. 478
This model would allow legislative discretion in the creation of a
districting plan, while supplying outer limits of constitutionality. The court
would not become embroiled in state-level policy decisions. Another
benefit of this standard is that it requires legislators to articulate the reasons
behind a districting plan and push towards a fairer result over time.
A political association analysis does not require the court to "extirpat[e]
politics from the inherently partisan process of districting, '479 but this
analysis recognizes that while not all district lines are neutral, some
districting plans involve a deliberate partisan harm, and courts should
regulate these particular lines. This standard, while carving only a minimal
role for courts would reduce at least the most egregious gerrymanders-
those when other parties were completely excluded (such as Vieth)480 and
mid-decade redistricting (such as Perry)481-without miring the judiciary in
mathematical calculations and statistical analysis based on potentially
unreliable political data.
CONCLUSION
Partisan gerrymandering occurs when legislatures provide an "'unfair
advantage"' to a particular party.482 Courts should continue to adjudicate
these claims and strike down legislation when legislatures seek naked
partisan advantage.483 Using the freedom of association analysis, courts
can ensure that voters have the ability to join political parties with at least
the opportunity to succeed in elections. The reframing of the constitutional
injury caused by partisan gerrymandering, and the redefinition of the test
for such violations will move our districting system one step closer to
realizing the goal of "full and effective participation," the basis of voting
rights and civil rights cases since the 1960s.484
477. See supra Part I.B.1.
478. See, e.g., supra note 178 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
482. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
696 (7th ed. 1999)).
483. See Silverberg, supra note 49, at 913.
484. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
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